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I.  INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF STUDY 
Nursing homes are special facilities that provide round-the-clock medical care to 
persons who, due to old age or disability, have difficulties in navigating activities of 
daily living (“ADL”), such as bathing, dressing, eating, and using the toilet.1 For 
                                                          
*Professor of Political Science, Chicago State University; Adjunct Professor of Law, Indiana 
University School of Law at Indianapolis.  We acknowledge the helpful suggestions of the 
Journal of Law and Health editorial board, which changed the original format of the 
manuscript but improved the Article.  We, however, hold ourselves solely responsible for any 
errors of omission or commission.   
**Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Akron.  Dr. Deason wrote a 
dissertation for her Ph.D. degree, received from Michigan State University in 2000, on the 
enforcement of nursing home regulations.  
***Assistant Professor of Political Science, Augusta State University. 
 1  See FAMILY CAREGIVER ALLIANCE, SURVEY OF NURSING HOME, ASSISTED LIVING, 
ADULT DAY SERVICES, AND HOME CARE COSTS (2009), available at http://www.metlife.com/ 
assets/cao/mmi/publications/studies/mmi-market-survey-nursing-home-assisted-living.pdf 
[hereinafter SURVEY OF NURSING HOME]; ROBERTA HUNT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNITY-
BASED NURSING 393-413 (Margaret Zuccarini et al. eds., Wolters Kluwer/Lippincott Williams 
& Wilkins, 4th ed. 2009).  About 68% (little more than two-thirds) of nursing home residents 
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these and related ADL tasks, nursing home residents receive help that is provided by 
a phalanx of caregivers, including nurses, physical therapists, occupational 
therapists, and social workers.2 Nursing homes are a common technique for 
delivering long-term care (i.e., services and supports to meet health and personal 
care needs over an extended period of time) in the U.S. and other industrialized 
countries.3 In the U.S., the history of these facilities dates back to the beginning of 
the twentieth century when, bereft of national government4 assistance for the care of 
elderly or disabled persons, many states relegated these destitute individuals to 
decrepit almshouses and poor farms.5  
Nursing home residents are individuals “who are not sick enough to need 
hospital care but are not able to remain at home.”6 These residents include the 
                                                          
have one to five limitations in their activities of daily living.  See Nursing Homes: Past, 
Present, and Future, BUSINESS INNOVATION FACTORY, http://www.businessinnovation 
factory.com/nhf/files/Nursing-Homes-in-America.pdf (last visited May 3, 2010) [hereinafter 
Nursing Homes].  
 2 See HUNT, supra note 1, at 393-413. 
 3 See Joan F. Van Nostrand et al., Nursing Home Care in Five Nations, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/nh5nates.htm (last visited Apr. 
24, 2010).  However, the popularity of traditional nursing homes as a technique of choice for 
delivery of long-term care is increasingly tempered by the fact that, since 2001, the nursing 
home industry has been losing ground to home health and community-based alternatives, 
including assisted living.  Ontario Health Coalition, CENTER FOR MEDICARE ADVOC. (Mar. 31, 
2009), www.web.net/ohc/TobyEdelmanPresentation%2003.31.09.ppt [hereinafter Ontario 
Health Coalition]. 
 4 Because the states are necessarily an integral component of the U.S. federal system, to 
minimize confusion, as much as possible, we use the term national government (rather than 
“federal government”) to designate or refer to the U.S. central government.  
 5 PBS, The Evolution of Nursing Home Care in the United States, THE ONLINE NEWS 
HOUR, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/nursinghomes/timeline.html (last visited May 3, 
2010) [hereinafter Evolution of Nursing Home Care].  A U.S. Dept. of Labor study in 1925 
found these homes to be marked by “dilapidation, inadequacy and even indecency.” A Brief 
History of Long-Term Care–Brief Article, BNET, 
 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3830/is_12_48/ai_58572867/ (last visited May 19, 
2010) [hereinafter Brief History of Long-Term Care].  Some states appeared to encourage the 
stigma of inadequate care as a motivating factor to keep people from relying on them.  In 
response, some immigrant communities established organizations that helped newcomers and 
the aged as a way around using public services.  Evolution of Nursing Home Care.  
 6 Nursing Home, BRITANNICA CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.answers.com/topic/ 
nursing-home (last visited May 3, 2010).  In response to payment incentives from the national 
government, during the 1990s, a new field of sub-acute care emerged to provide care for 
persons released from hospitals who still needed more care than found in intermediate-care 
nursing facilities.  Evolution of Nursing Home Care, supra note 5.  Medical conditions that 
can cause nursing home confinement include arthritis, cancer, cardiovascular diseases, 
dementia (including Alzheimer’s disease), depression, diabetes, falls (3 out of 4 nursing home 
residents fall each year, double the rate for older adults living in the community, due to 
environmental hazards, such as wet floors, incorrect bed position, poor lighting, and 
improperly fitted or maintained wheelchairs; one-third of these falls result in injury, and 
approximately 1,800 nursing home patients die each year from falls), glaucoma, high blood 
pressure, incontinence, muscular degeneration, obesity, and stroke, among others. See Nursing 
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elderly (usually individuals 65 years and above) and younger adults with physical or 
mental disabilities.7 Nearly two-thirds of nursing home residents are females; the 
remaining one-third are males.8  As the nation’s population grays,9 more and more 
Americans are living in nursing homes.10 According to the Government 
Accountability Office (“GAO”), in 2009, more than 1.5 million people resided in the 
nation’s estimated 16,000 nursing homes.11  The GAO is an arm of Congress, created 
under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, that has conducted numerous studies 
on nursing homes.  Dubbed “the investigative arm of Congress,” and “congressional 
watchdog,” the agency supports Congress in meeting its constitutional obligations as 
well as helps improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal 
government through various means that include oversight of federal programs.12 In 
the language of its infomercial, the agency “keep[s] a close eye on virtually every 
federal program, activity, and function,” and, “[i]ts highly trained evaluators 
examine everything from missiles to medicine, from aviation safety to food safety, 
from national security to social security.”13 Formerly known as the General 
                                                          
Homes, supra note 1.  In 2009, the average cost of a nursing home stay was $219 per day for a 
private room or $79,935 a year.  SURVEY OF NURSING HOME, supra note 1, at 5 (table). The 
costs vary across nursing homes and from region to region, with some regional nursing homes 
charging lower than this figure and others higher.  Id. at 14-19 (table). 
 7 See HUNT, supra note 1, at 393-418; JANICE RIDER ELLIS AND CECILIA LOVE HARTLEY, 
NURSING IN TODAY’S WORLD: TRENDS, ISSUES, AND MANAGEMENT 12 (Hilarie Surrena, ed., 
Wolters Kluwer Health/Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 9th ed. 2008).  It is estimated that 
about 66% or nearly two-thirds of nursing home residents are persons in the 75-84 and 85-94 
age brackets.  Of the 66%, over 34% are in the 75-84 age range, while nearly 32% belong in 
the 85-94 age category.  Nursing Homes, supra note 1. 
 8 See Nursing Homes, supra note 1 (in terms of gender 66.5% are females and 33.5% are 
males).   
 9 STEFFEN W. SCHMIDT ET. AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS TODAY 20 
(Thomson Wadsworth, 6th ed. 2005-2006) (noting, “Long a nation of growth, the United States 
has also become a middle-aged nation with a low birthrate and an increasing number of old 
citizens who want services from the government.”).  At the time this text was published, the 
median age of the U.S. population was 35.5, a number projected to increase to 36.2 years by 
2050.  Id.  
 10 From a comparative standpoint, this is a phenomenon not unique to the U.S. but rather 
is as well observable in other industrialized countries, including even Japan which, in the past, 
had few nursing homes.  See Van Nostrand et al., supra note 3.    
 11 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 10-70, ADDRESSING THE FACTORS 
UNDERLYING THE UNDERSTATEMENT OF SERIOUS CARE PROBLEMS REQUIRES SUSTAINED CMS 
AND STATE COMMITMENT (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1070.pdf.;  
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 89-689, CMS'S SPECIAL FOCUS FACILITY 
METHODOLOGY SHOULD BETTER TARGET THE MOST POORLY PERFORMING HOMES, WHICH 
TENDED TO BE CHAIN-AFFILIATED AND FOR-PROFIT (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
ew.items/d09689.pdf. 
 12 Welcome to GAO, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,   http://www.gao.gov (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2010). 
 13 U.S. GAO, GAO: Working for Good Government Since 1921, U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/about/history/articles/working-for-good-govern 
ment/01-introduction.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2010). 
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Accounting Office, the GAO changed its name (while making sure to retain the same 
acronym) to its present name in July 2004.14 The GAO figure above does not include 
other persons who use these facilities.  According to the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (“CMMS”), another organization, like the GAO, versed in this 
topic,15 in 2006, about 2.8 million patients stayed in a nursing home (the number 
includes both long-term and short-term residents after hospitalization).16  This trend 
is expected to increase, beginning in 2011, when the first set of “baby boomers,”17 
persons born in 1946, turns 65 years and becomes senior citizens. It is projected that, 
based on current trends, by 2030, an estimated 5 million people will need nursing 
home care, and that by 2020, nursing homes will need an estimated 66%  more 
nurses.18 Nursing home care costs account for about 6% of the nation’s overall 
healthcare spending;19 in 2006 total government spending for nursing homes reached 
a high of $125 billion.20  For staffing alone, Congress increased its reimbursement to 
the states from $24.8 billion in 1990 to $51 billion in 1998.21  
This study analyzes the influence of political factors, oversight, and nursing 
home affiliation or ownership status on the enforcement of the nursing home 
regulatory regime,22 signified by the Nursing Home Reform Act ("NHRA") and its 
progeny.23  Specifically speaking, it measures, using the statistical technique of 
regression analysis, factors that account for variations across states in the number of 
deficiencies (or violations of quality standards) cited by nursing home inspectors 
                                                          
 14 David M. Walker, GAO Answers the Question: What’s in a Name?, U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/about/rollcall07192004.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 
2010). 
 15 Although the acronym suggests a monolithic organization, this is not true, judging even 
by the plural, “Centers” in the name of the organization.  The practice in the literature is to 
spell the acronym of the organization in a manner that elides one of the “M”s.  Because we 
surmise the practice confusing to the reader, we use an abbreviation that includes the two 
“M”s.  More information on this agency can be found in Part III, infra, analyzing the nursing 
home inspection system.  
 16 Nursing Homes, supra note 1. 
 17 “Baby boomers” are persons born in the period following World War II from 1946 to 
1964.  In the U.S., about 75 million persons, making up about 29% of the nation’s population, 
were born during this period.  See Baby Boomer Headquarters, So What’s a Boomer, 
Anyhow?, BABY BOOMER HEADQUARTERS, http://www.bbhq.com/whatsabm.htm (last visited 
October 13, 2010).  The term “baby boomer” was coined by Landon Jones in his book Great 
Expectations: America and the Baby Boom Generation. LANDON Y. JONES, GREAT 
EXPECTATIONS: AMERICA AND THE BABY BOOM GENERATION (Coward, McCann, and 
Geoghegan, 1980).  
 18 Nursing Homes, supra note 1.  As the term “nursing” in these facilities bears out, nurses 
form a critical element in the resources necessary for the effective operation of nursing homes.    
 19 Nursing Homes, supra note 1, at 23. 
 20 Id.  
 21 Ontario Health Coalition, supra note 3. 
 22 For the definition of this term, see infra note 31 and corresponding text.   
 23 This law and the various initiatives designed to promote its effective enforcement are 
discussed in Part II.   
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across the states.  Our database comprised a sample size of 463 cases, drawn from 49 
out of 50 U.S. states, excluding Nebraska, which has a unicameral legislature.  Our 
statistical findings generally confirmed the six theses we tested regarding the 
influence of political factors and other variables on enforcement of nursing home 
regulations.24 Our coefficient of determination, adjusted r-square, indicated that these 
various factors, controlling for other possible variables from 1995 to 2004, 
accounted for 51% of the variance in our dependent variable.  This result is adjudged 
high in social science fields, such as here, with a history of notoriously low 
prediction.25  
There are two interconnected segments to the organization of this article: the 
conceptual issues necessary for proper examination and reader understanding of this 
research, and our statistical analysis.  The first segment comprises Sections II to IV, 
while Section V embodies the second. Section II discusses the nursing home 
regulatory regime and performs a double function as background overview of the 
field.  Section III presents an overview of the nursing home inspection system.  It 
extends the discussion in the previous section and clarifies for the reader, beyond the 
level achieved in Section II, the national government's participation in an issue-area 
which, under the allocation of power scheme of the U.S. federal system,26 is a state 
function.  Section IV analyzes the role of administrators in the policymaking process 
and justifies our focus on "political factors" in an era of American public 
administration, such as the present, marked by extensive involvement of public 
administrators in public policy (not the fiction in the past that claims to separate 
politics and administration).  Turning to segment two, our statistical analysis, 
Section V presents a review of the potentially influential factors in this study and 
outcomes on each of the three variables, namely: political party affiliation, oversight, 
and affiliation or ownership status of nursing homes. Discussion on each of the 
variables, in turn, embraces a survey of previous studies and scholarship, definition 
and operationalization of key terms, theses and underlying assumptions, and results. 
Since the passage of the NHRA in 1987, various organs of the U.S. national 
government have published numerous volumes that have evaluated various aspects 
of the regulatory regime introduced by this statute and its progeny, including the 
                                                          
 24 Details on these results are provided in Part V  of this Article.  
 25 JAMES M. DANZINGER, UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL WORLD: A COMPARATIVE 
INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 18 (Pearson Longman, 9th ed. 2009).  As its very title 
betrays, this work focuses on the political science discipline.  Two of various criticisms of the 
discipline as a "science" that apply here are that (1) it is not a "real" science, and (2) its subject 
matter defies generalization. See DANZINGER, supra, at 18.  Regarding the first, the discipline 
lacks the qualities that characterize natural and applied sciences, such as chemistry, 
engineering, and physics.  Unlike scholars in these other disciplines, researchers in political 
science "have not agreed on a coherent set of concepts, theories, and rules of interpretation.”  
Id. Concerning the second criticism, "the political world is far too complex and unpredictable 
for systematic generalizations.” Id. Specifically, "[p]olitics is based on the actions and 
interactions of many individuals, groups, and even countries [,]” and "occurs in the midst of 
many changing conditions that can influence those actions.” Id. These ever-changing 
conditions render non-probabilistic generalizations difficult, if not impossible, in politics.   
 26 For definition of the term, federalism, see infra note 89. 
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inspection system.  These organs include the GAO,27 the U.S. Senate,28 the U.S. 
House of Representatives,29 and the Department of Health and Human Services 
("DHHS").30 This work is a first of its kind, an analysis not government-related, by a 
set of public administration scholars that systematically studies the influence of 
political forces on nursing home regulations and inspection and their ultimate effect 
on the well-being of nursing home patients. 
                                                          
 27  Studies conducted by the GAO include U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
GAO/HEHS 00-197, SUSTAINED EFFORTS ARE ESSENTIAL TO REALIZE POTENTIAL OF THE 
QUALITY INITIATIVES (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/he00197.pdf; U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/HEHS 00-6, NURSING HOME CARE: ENHANCED HCFA 
OVERSIGHT OF STATE PROGRAMS WOULD BETTER ENSURE QUALITY (1999), available at 
http://www.awol-texas.org/articles/he00006.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
GAO/HEHS 99-46, NURSING HOMES: ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN 
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL QUALITY STANDARDS (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
archive/1999/he99046.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/HEHS 99-80, NURSING 
HOMES: COMPLAINT INVESTIGATION PROCESSES OFTEN INADEQUATE TO PROTECT RESIDENTS 
(1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99080.pdf; U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/HEHS 98-202, CALIFORNIA NURSING HOMES: CARE PROBLEMS 
PERSIST DESPITE FEDERAL AND STATE OVERSIGHT (1998), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98202.pdf.  
 28 These studies, all of them hearings by the Senate Special Committee on Aging, include 
The Nursing Home Initiative: A Two-Year Progress Report: Hearing Before the Spec. Comm. 
on Aging, 106th Cong. (2000), available at http://aging.senate.gov/hearing_detail.cfm? 
id=272287&; Nursing Home Bankruptcies: What Caused Them?: Hearing Before the Spec. 
Comm. on Aging, 106th Cong. (2000), available at http://aging.senate.gov/hearing_detail.cfm 
?id=272282&; Nursing Home Residents Short-Changed by Staff Shortages, Part II: Hearing 
Before the Spec. Comm. on Aging, 106th Cong. (2000), available at http://aging.senate.gov/ 
hearing_detail.cfm?id=272279&; HCFA Regional Offices: Inconsistent, Uneven, and Unfair: 
Hearing Before the Spec. Comm. on Aging, 106th Cong. (1999), available at 
http://aging.senate.gov/hearing_detail.cfm?id=272306&; Forum: Nursing Home Residents 
Short-Changed by Staff Shortages: Hearing Before the Spec. Comm. on Aging, 106th Cong. 
(1999), available at http://aging.senate.gov/hearing_detail.cfm?id=272305&; Forum: 
Consumers Assess the Nursing Home Initiative: Hearing Before the Spec. Comm. on Aging, 
106th Cong. (1999), available at http://aging.senate.gov/hearing_detail.cfn?id=272304&; The 
Nursing Home Initiative: Results at Year One: Hearing Before the Spec. Comm. on Aging, 
106th Cong. (2000), available at http://aging.senate.gov/hearing_detail.cfm?id=272299&; 
Residents at Risk: Weaknesses Persist in Nursing Home Complaint Investigation and 
Enforcement: Hearing Before the Spec. Comm. on Aging, 106th Cong. (1999), available at 
http://aging.senate.gov/hearing_detail.cfm? id=272290&; Betrayal: The Quality of Care in 
California’s Nursing Homes: Hearing Before the Spec. Comm. on Aging, 105th Cong. (1998), 
available at http://aging.senate.gov/hearings _detail.cfm?id=276917&. 
 29 See Trends in Nursing Home Ownership and Quality: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Health of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. (2007), available at  
http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/InfoByTopic/SkilledNursingFacility/SNF_07_11.15.Testi
monyReNursingHomes.pdf. 
 30 DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., APPROPRIATENESS OF MINIMUM NURSE STAFFING 
RATIOS IN NURSING HOMES (2007), available at http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/ 
abt-nursestaffingratios%2812-01%29-999.pdf. 
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II.  THE NURSING HOME REGULATORY REGIME  
A regime is a term of art, with roots in international relations theory, that denotes 
a set of formal institutions (such as rules, norms, procedures) and informal 
understandings or expectations that govern behavior in a certain issue-area.31  
Drawing on this definition, the nursing home regulatory regime comprises formal 
institutions and informal arrangements that, over the past seventy-five years, have 
contributed individually and collectively to shape the nursing home industry.  We 
approach this conversation in terms of key events in the field.  The first such 
development was the Social Security Act of 1935.32 The law provided matching 
grants to each state for Old Age Assistance (“OAA”) to retired workers.33 But to 
discourage almshouse living, residents of public institutions were not eligible for the 
payments.  To get around this barrier, individuals and organizations established a 
variety of private old-age homes to qualify for and collect OAA payments.34 
Subsequent amendments to the Social Security Act introduced reforms that inured to 
the benefit of nursing home patients.  These included the Hospital Survey and 
Construction (or Hill-Burton) Act of 1946,35 which lifted the ban on extending 
benefits to residents of public facilities;36 a set of changes in 1950 imposing 
requirements for state licensing of nursing homes;37 and amendments in 1954 that 
extended grants for nursing homes built “in conjunction with a hospital.”38 The last 
                                                          
 31 See,e.g., INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1-2 (Stephen D. Krasner, ed., Cornell Univ. Press 
1983); ANDREAS HASENCLEVER, ET. AL., THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1997); Charles Lipson, Why are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 
INT’L ORG. 495-538 (1991).   
 32 Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935), now codified as the Social 
Security Act 42 U.S.C.S. § 7 (LexisNexis 2010).  The legislative history of the act indicated 
that the law was designed “to provide for the general welfare by establishing a system of 
Federal old-age benefits, and by enabling the several States to make more adequate provision 
for aged persons, blind persons,” among other vulnerable groups.  Legislative History: Social 
Security Act of 1935, SOC. SECURITY ONLINE (2010), http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/ 
35actpre.html. The act was drafted during President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first term in 
office by his Committee on Economic Security, headed by Frances Perkins, then Secretary of 
Labor, and passed by Congress as part of the New Deal program.  By signing the measure into 
law on Aug. 14, 1935, Roosevelt became the first president to advocate the protection of the 
elderly. See ANDREW ACHENBAUM, SOCIAL SECURITY VISIONS AND REVISIONS 25-26 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1986).  
 33 See 49 Stat. 602.   
 34 Evolution of Nursing Home Care, supra note 5. 
 35 Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 79-719, 60 Stat. 978 (1946).  The law took its name 
from its two sponsors, Senator Lister Hill of Alabama and Senator Harold Burton of Ohio.  In 
1975, the act was amended and became Title XVI of the Public Health Service Act.  See Harry 
Perlstadt, The Development of the Hill-Burton Legislation: Interests, Issues, and 
Compromises, 6 J. HEALTH AND SOC. POL’Y 77-96 (1995); VIRGINIA V. HAMILTON, LISTER 
HILL: STATESMAN FROM THE SOUTH (Univ. of N. Carolina Press 1987).  
 36 HAMILTON, supra note 35.  
 37 Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 823 (1968).  
 38 Nursing Homes, supra note 1. 
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laid the ground for the modeling of the physical construction of nursing homes after 
hospitals,39 and, equally important, transformed nursing homes from being part of 
the welfare system to being part of the healthcare system.  Some other amendments 
to the Social Security Act passed in 196540 incorporated Medicare and Medicaid.41 
These changes were an integral part of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s “Great 
Society” campaign against poverty,42 and came in the wake of nursing home 
scandals, such as the one in New York in 1960 that uncovered problems in nursing 
home staffing, code requirements, and financial irregularities.43 In signing the 
measures into law on July 30, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson noted that 
“[c]ompassion and reason dictate that this logical extension of our proven Social 
Security system will supply the prudent, feasible, and dignified way to free the aged 
from the fear of financial hardship in the event of illness.”44 More reforms came in 
1965 with the passage of the Moss Amendments,45 which authorized the then 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) to standardize regulations 
for Medicare and Medicaid and to withhold funding from nursing homes that failed 
to meet those standards.46 Key details of the changes included regulations mandating 
                                                          
 39 Brief History of Long-Term Care, supra note 5. 
 40 See Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965). 
 41 Medicare is a health insurance program for senior citizens, 65 and older. Medicare, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Medicare.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 
2010). In 1972, the U.S. government extended the program to cover disabled persons.  See 
Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 329 (1972).  A recent change to the program 
is the Medicare Modernization Act, signed into law on Dec. 8, 2003, by another president 
from Texas, George W. Bush.  The law adds an outpatient prescription drug benefit to 
Medicare, among other changes.  Medicare Modernization Update: Overview, CENTERS FOR 
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, https://www.cms.gov/mmaupdate/ (last visited Sept. 23, 
2010).  Medicaid is the nation's main program used to provide healthcare to Americans with 
low incomes.  Medicaid, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/edicaid. 
spx (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).  In March 2010, the U.S. government, under Barack Obama, 
adopted yet another overhaul of healthcare with ramifications for nursing home policy.  See 
Jennifer Loven, It’s the Law of the Land: Health Overhaul Signed, ABC NEWS (2010), 
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=10176172.  
 42 Built into proposals traceable to John F. Kennedy’s “New Frontier,” the social reforms 
that formed the Great Society agenda aimed to combat poverty and racial injustice.  Johnson 
shared his goals for the Great Society in a speech at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor 
on May 22, 1964, during which speech he pledged that his administration would study 
numerous “emerging challenges” facing the country from which “studies, we will begin to set 
our course toward the Great Society.”  See Remarks at the University of Michigan, May 22, 
1964, LBJ LIBRARY & MUSEUM, http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/ 
speeches.hom/640522.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).  For some of the numerous works 
published on this program, see JOHN A. ANDREW, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE GREAT SOCIETY 
(Ivan R. Dee 1998);  THE GREAT SOCIETY AND ITS LEGACY: TWENTY YEARS OF U.S. SOCIAL 
POLICY (Marshall Kaplan and Peggy L. Cuciti, eds., Duke Univ. Press 1986).    
 43 Evolution of Nursing Home Care, supra note 5.  
 44 Id. 
 45 See Social Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821 (1967).   
 46 Id.  See also Karen Stevenson, Moss Amendments Strengthen Fire and Nursing 
Standards, ELDER WEB (APR. 29, 2007), http://www.elderweb.com/node/9705.   
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nursing homes to meet the life safety code of the National Fire Protection 
Association; the requirement that skilled nursing facilities have at least one full-time 
registered nurse (RN) on staff; and the requirement, under pain of federal law, for 
nursing homes to disclose their ownership and financial interests so as to make it 
easier to identify fraud and abuse.47 Recall that percolating changes dating back to 
the 1950s included a requirement for state licensing of nursing homes.48 Part of the 
landscape of changes during the 1960s, in the aftermath of the Moss amendments, 
was an amendment by Senator Ted Kennedy mandating state licensing of nursing 
home administrators.49 
Like in anything else, progress in regulation was not unilinear but was instead 
occasionally marked by setbacks.  For example, in April of 1969, in response to 
rising costs sparked by the enthusiastic response to Medicare, HEW released a 
statement that eliminated much of the coverage for nursing homes that Medicare had 
initially allowed.50 This change in policy left thousands of elderly persons and their 
families with huge medical bills.51 Another temporized measure of change took place 
in 1981, when, in the aftermath of another outbreak of nursing home scandals across 
the country during the mid-1970s that paralleled and exceeded the ones of the 
previous decade, Congress passed the Boren Amendment,52 mandating states to 
ensure “reasonable and adequate” provider reimbursement rates.53 
The emerging literature, popular and scholastic alike,54 tapped into the 
disconcerting atmosphere of widespread lapses in nursing home care across the 
nation and lent testimony to public frustration about the slow pace of reform.  For 
example, in 1974, one analyst wrote a book portraying the "tender loving-greed"  of 
the nursing home industry in "exploiting America's old people and defrauding us 
                                                          
 47 Stevenson, supra note 46. 
 48 See 81 Stat. 823.  
 49 Pub. L. No. 92-223, § 1908, 85 Stat. 802, 809-10 (1967).  See also S. 3436, 89th Cong. 
(1967); S. 3384, 89th Cong. (1967); ROBERT STEVENS AND ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE 
MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 153 (2003). 
 50 See Evolution of Nursing Home Care, supra note 5 (citing U.S. Dep't of Health, 
Education and Welfare, Social Security Admin., Bureau of Health Insurance, Intermediary 
Letter No. 371 (Apr. 1969)). 
 51 Evolution of Nursing Home Care, supra note 5.  Opposition to these new standards by 
individuals and nursing homes impelled Congress to enact a “compromise” measure, creating 
a new standard, denoted “intermediate-care facilities,” which permitted some homes to qualify 
for federal reimbursement while maintaining the same level of nursing care or resources.  Id.  
The reclassification saved money for the government–but at the expense of lower standards of 
care for nursing home residents.  Id.  
 52 Named after Senator David Boren of Oklahoma, who sponsored the bill, the amendment 
was passed as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. See Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).    
 53 Id. Congress, under the control of the Republican Party, repealed the Boren Amendment 
in 1997.  Evolution of Nursing Home Care, supra note 5.  
 54 For example, in 1950, the magazine Nursing Homes was founded.  About the same 
period, Mosby published the first text on Geriatric Nursing in the U.S. by Kathleen Newton.  
See Brief History of Long-Term Care, supra note 5.   
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all."55 The frustration regarding the slow pace of change was also noticeable in 
official circles.  In May of 1975, for instance, the Commissioner of the 
Administration on Aging released a statement that  depicted residents of nursing 
homes as "powerless."56 The official first observed that the U.S. "[h]as been 
conducting investigations, passing new laws, and issuing new regulations relative to 
nursing homes at a rapid rate during the past few years."57 However, "[a]ll of this 
activity will be of little avail unless our communities are organized in such a manner 
that new laws and regulations are utilized to deal with the individual complaints of 
older people who are living in nursing homes[,]" given that "[t]he individual in the 
nursing home is powerless."58  The commissioner then poignantly closed with the 
notation that "[i]f the laws and regulations are not being applied to [nursing home 
residents], they might just as well not have been passed or issued.”59 
Another key event in the nursing home regulatory regime was the passage of the 
Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987.60 Like with the Boren Amendment,61 President 
Ronald Reagan signed this measure into law only as part of a budget reconciliation 
package.  The law marked “the largest overhaul of federal regulations for nursing 
homes” since the amendments to the Social Security Act in 1965 creating Medicare 
and Medicaid,62 and the most ambitious attempt since these amendments to create a 
set of national standards for the care and treatment of patients in nursing homes.63 
Although this law took place during his administration, President Reagan cannot 
take credit for this measure, given his general antipathy toward regulation and 
decided solicitude for businesses.  For example, his administration considered 
eliminating nursing home residents’ rights, as a condition for participation by 
licensed facilities in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.  Although the plan itself 
was never announced, the draft of the proposal leaked out.64 Also, Reagan made a 
proposal in 1982 for infrequent inspection surveys that also made allowance for    
self-survey.65 Given Reagan’s antipathy toward regulation, the initiative for 
regulatory action during his two terms in office fell on Congress, led by the 
Democratic Party, which seized on that initiative, repeating a pattern regarding 
                                                          
 55 See generally MARY A. MENDELSON, TENDER LOVING-GREED: HOW THE INCREDIBLY 
LUCRATIVE NURSING HOME BUSINESS IS EXPLOITING AMERICA’S OLD PEOPLE AND 
DEFRAUDING US ALL (Alfred A. Knopf 1974).  
 56 Ombudsmen Program History: The Long-Term Care Ombudsman Program 1972-
2009—Program Milestones, ADMINISTRATION ON AGING, http://www.Itcombudsman.org/ 
about-ombudsmen/program-history (last visited Apr. 9, 2010). 
 57 Id.  
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1300 (1987).  
 61 See 95 Stat. 172. 
 62 Evolution of Nursing Home Care, supra note 5.  
 63 Ontario Health Coalition, supra note 3.  
 64 Id.   
 65 Id.   
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integration of human rights values into U.S. foreign policy that took place under a 
previous Republican administration.66 Democratic Party lawmakers in Congress 
responded to Reagan’s proposals with two legislative moratoria preventing 
deregulation.  As the second moratorium was about to expire, Congress entered into 
agreement with the Health Care Financing Administration (“HCFA”),67 to fund a 
study conducted by the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”).68 Released in 1986, the study 
recommended changes to the entire federal oversight system for nursing homes, 
including requirements of participation  for facilities, survey, and enforcement.69 The 
recommendations formed the basis for the preparation and passage of the NHRA in 
1987.70  
Under the NHRA, the Secretary of Health and Human Services was vested with 
broad powers to devise and enforce standards for the health, safety, welfare, and 
                                                          
 66 This was under Richard Nixon when Congress, controlled by the Democratic Party, led 
the initiative, in opposition to Nixon’s Vietnam policy, by passing human rights legislation 
that, among other things, forbade the extension of U.S. aid to foreign leaders that grossly 
violate the human rights of their own citizens.  See, e.g., Margaret E. Galey, The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: The Role of Congress, PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 524, 525 (1998); 
Jimmy Carter, The American Road to a Human Rights Policy, in REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: 
MOVING FROM INSPIRATION TO IMPACT 49 (Samantha Power and Graham Allison, eds., 2000); 
John Shattuck, Diplomacy with a Cause: Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy in REALIZING 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 269-72 (Samantha Power and Graham Allison, eds., 2000). Carter, 
in his essay, recounted, “Before the presidential election in 1976, a Democratic Congress had 
enacted a law requiring the State Department to evaluate and report on the state of human 
rights in nations designated to receive military-related aid.  We aimed to follow through in 
implementing this legislation.” Carter, supra, at 54.   
 67 Established in 1977 as an agency under the DHHS, the HCFA, on July 1, 2001, changed 
its name to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMMS”).  See infra note 100 
and corresponding text.      
 68 Founded in 1970, the IOM seeks “to help those in government and the private sector 
make informed health decisions by providing evidence upon which they can rely.”  About the 
IOM, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMICS, http://www.iom.edu/About-
IOM.aspx (last visited on Aug. 13, 2010).  The organization touts itself as “the health arm of 
the National Academy of Sciences, chartered under President Abraham Lincoln in 1863.”  Id.  
Some of the studies the IOM “undertakes began as specific mandates from Congress; still 
others are requested by federal agencies and independent organizations.”  Id.   
 69 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES (1986).  
The report recognized nurse staffing as a major factor determining quality of care and quality 
of life (but did not recommend specific staffing ratios; rather, it called for standardized 
resident assessment data and empirical studies to determine appropriate staff levels).  Id.  It 
urged facilities to “place their highest priority on the recruitment, retention, and support of 
adequate numbers of professional nurses” with training in gerontology and geriatrics.  Id. at 
103. 
 70 IOM staff challenged the staff of National Citizens’ Coalition for Nursing Home 
Reform (“NCCNHR”) to work for enactment of the recommendations as federal law.  The 
Coalition then formed Campaign for Quality Care (“CQC”), made up of healthcare 
professionals, and advocates of the nursing home industry, to identify IOM recommendations 
that should become law.  CQC met frequently for a year to discuss IOM’s recommendations.  
Ontario Health Coalition, supra note 3.  
12 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 24:1 
 
rights of nursing home residents.71 Each of the three distinct yet interconnected areas 
of nursing home policy – care quality for residents, inspection of facilities, and 
enforcement – was enriched in scope beyond anything seen before.  Beginning with 
quality of care and life for nursing home residents, the law mandated facilities 
applying for Medicare or Medicaid funding to provide services designed to ensure 
that each resident attained and maintained the "highest practicable physical, mental, 
and psycho-social well-being."72 This guarantee not only protected nursing home 
residents from mistreatments, such as abuse, neglect, and loss of personal 
belongings, that can mark life in  nursing homes, but also affords them a phalanx of 
other rights that includes freedom from physical restraints; the right to be treated 
with dignity; the right to determine for themselves; the right to privacy; the right to 
accommodation of medical, physical, psychological, and social needs; the right to 
participate in resident and family groups; the right to participate in the review of 
one's care plan, and to be fully informed in advance about any changes in care, 
treatment, or change of status in the facility; and the right to voice grievances 
without discrimination or reprisal.73 
With respect to inspections (designed to ensure that nursing home facilities meet 
their quality goals), the NHRA requires states to conduct periodic, unannounced, 
surveys of nursing homes.74 These surveys, which must be led by trained and tested 
surveyors, must include interviews of residents at least once every fifteen months; 
and they must focus on the overall quality of care, quality of life, and quality of 
services provided to residents in nursing homes.75 Finally, regarding enforcement, 
the law stipulated the enactment of a range of intermediate sanctions  and imposed 
more significant remedies for uncorrected or repeated deficiencies.76  Table 3 in the 
appendix encapsulates the full range of these enforcement sanctions, consisting of 
                                                          
 71 See generally 101 Stat. 1300 (1987); see also Ontario Health Coalition, supra note 3. 
 72 101 Stat. 1300 (1987); 42 C.F.R § 483 (West 2010).  The phrase mimics or calls to 
mind the provision in Art.12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (“ICESCR”) which stipulates, “The State Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.”  G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 at 
51 (1966).  The U.S. signed the instrument but has yet to ratify (and therefore become a state 
party to) the instrument.  Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in Art.  25, 
stipulates: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and 
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age and other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his 
control.”  G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. DOC. A/810, at 71 (1948). 
 73 See HANDBOOK OF GERONTOLOGY: EVIDENCE-BASED APPROACHES TO THEORY, 
PRACTICE, AND POLICY (James A. Blackburn & Catherine N. Dulmus eds., John Wiley & Sons 
2007). As part of the quality of life element this law introduced, nurse aides must be trained 
and competent to provide care; before 1987, half of the states did not require any training.  
Ontario Health Coalition, supra note 3. The law also promised “sufficient staff” to meet 
residents’ needs, including provision of a registered nurse on the day shift (regardless of the 
size of the facility), and availability of licensed nurses around the clock.  Id.    
 74 101 Stat. 1300. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id.  See also Ontario Health Coalition, supra note 3.  
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civil monetary penalties, temporary management, denial of payments, directed in-
service training, directed plan of correction, state monitoring, and termination.77 The 
table also includes a comparison of the scenario before passage of the NHRA (when 
the only sanctions in existence were denial of payments and termination) with the 
situation since the passage of the Act, encompassing all seven sanctions.78 
Tremendous progress in promoting access to better-quality care for residents in 
nursing homes  across the country has been made in the more than two decades since 
the passage of the NHRA.79 As indicated before, of the panoply of seven sanctions 
for violations summarized in Table 3 of this article that exists today, only two, denial 
of payments, and termination, were in place before passage of the NHRA in 1987.80 
The law was strengthened in 1995 when the Clinton administration issued 
regulations designed to enforce it; the action followed an attempt by the 104th 
Congress, under Republican Party control, to repeal the act that President Clinton 
vetoed.81 Clinton followed this up in 1998 and again, toward the end of his term in 
September of 2000, with a series of measures aimed at improving enforcement of 
nursing home quality standards.82 For all of these advances, much still remains to be 
done to reach the target of services for residents that meet their "highest practicable 
physical, mental, and psycho-social well-being" that this law stipulates.  For 
example, in 2008, the American Association of Homes and Services for the Aging 
(“AAHSA”), trade association of not-for-profit facilities, issued a report, revealingly 
                                                          
 77  GAO/HEHS 99-46, NURSING HOMES: ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED TO STRENGHTEN 
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL QUALITY STANDARDS, supra note 27. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See, e.g., Nursing Home Reform Act (OBRA ’87): 20 Years of History, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/he00006.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2010) (detailing events over 
20 years from 1987 to 2007 regarding nursing home care). 
 80 See GAO/HEHS 99-46, NURSING HOMES: ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED TO STRENGHTEN 
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL QUALITY STANDARDS, supra note 27; see also supra note 77 and 
corresponding text. 
 81 Balanced Budget Reconciliation Act, S. 1357, 104th Cong. § 7421 (1995); see also 
Brief History of Long-Term Care, supra note 5. 
 82 See William Hovey, The Worst of Both Worlds: Nursing Homes Regulation in the 
United States, 17 POL’Y STUD. REV. 43-59 (2000).  The measures included inspecting nursing 
homes at random times, including weekends and evenings; targeting repeat offenders with 
serious violations for frequent follow-up surveys; terminating federal funding of states which 
fail to provide adequate surveys; imposing immediate sanctions against nursing homes found 
guilty of a repeat offense where a resident is harmed; and permitting states to impose civil 
monetary penalties for serious or chronic violation of quality standards.  Clinton’s 2000 
initiatives, released in the course of a radio address, focused on improving nursing home 
staffing (recruitment, retention, and training of nursing personnel) through various means that 
included imposition of civil money penalties, and providing a $1 billion grant.  Ontario 
Health Coalition, supra note 3.  See also The Nursing Home Initiative: The Results at Year 
One: Hearing Before the S.  Special Comm. on Aging, 106th Cong. (June 30, 1999) 
(describing the results of a congressional hearing on the 1998 initiatives). 
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titled “broken and beyond repair,” calling for a “new oversight model.”83 The 
American Health Care Association (“AHCA”), a trade association of primarily for-
profit facilities, concluded similarly, positing that the system of nursing home 
inspection "does not reliably measure quality.  It does not create any positive 
incentives."84 It assessed inspectors to be "subjective and inconsistent" because 
"[t]hey interpret federal standards in different ways,"85 and it found cases in which 
nursing home operators billed the national government for services that "were not 
provided, or were so wholly deficient that they amounted to no care at all."86 
Until today, poor enforcement of existing laws remains the bane of the nursing 
home regulatory regime.  This is an occurrence detrimental to patients, the intended 
beneficiaries of all nursing home regulations, as study after study by U.S. 
government agencies seems to validate.87 Added to this problem is the issue 
surrounding ownership of nursing homes by large private investment groups.  A 
study of more than 15,000 nursing homes nationwide in 2007 (over 1,000 of this 
number purchased by large private investment groups) found that many operators of 
                                                          
 83 See Broken and Beyond Repair: Recommendations to Reform the Survey and 
Certification System, AM. ASS’N OF HOMES AND SERVS. FOR THE AGING (June 2008), available 
at http://www.aahsa.org/WorkArea/showcontent.aspx?id=3306. 
 84 Quoted in Robert Pear, Report Finds Violations At Most Nursing Homes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 30, 2008) at A20. 
 85 Id.  
 86 Id.  
 87 See e.g., Medicaid Reform: Quality of Care in Nursing Homes at Risk: Hearing Before 
the S. Special Comm. on Aging , 104th Cong. (Oct. 26, 1995) (incorporating Senator William 
Cohen’s observation to the effect that “[r]ecent inspections of nursing homes reveal that 
deficiencies, ranging from substandard care to conditions posing immediate harm to residents, 
still exist in many nursing homes nation wide.”); Federal Implementation of OBRA 1987 
Nursing Home Reform Provision: Hearing Before the S. Special Comm. on Aging, 101st 
Cong. (1989) (incorporating Senator David Pryor’s assessment that implementation of NHRA 
is “seriously floundering.”); Betrayal: The Quality of Care in California’s Nursing Homes, 
supra note 28 (incorporating the complaint of Senator Herb Kohl about how “[t]oo many 
people are suffering and dying” even though “[w]e have laws and regulations already in place 
that should be preventing these problems, but they are not enforced in any meaningful way”) 
(emphasis added); DHHS, supra note 30 (reporting violations in over nine of every ten 
nursing  homes across the country; that about 17% of nursing homes had deficiencies that 
caused "actual harm or immediate jeopardy" to residents; and substantiating 39% of over 
37,000 complaints about conditions in nursing homes). See also GAO 10-70, ADDRESSING THE 
FACTORS UNDERLYING THE UNDERSTATEMENT OF SERIOUS CARE PROBLEMS REQUIRES 
SUSTAINED CMS AND STATE COMMITMENT, supra note 11 (finding that, from 2002 to 2007, 
“approximately 70 percent of comparative surveys nationwide” identified “at least one missed 
deficiency”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-517, NURSING HOMES: FEDERAL 
MONITORING SURVEYS DEMONSTRATE CONTINUED UNDERSTATEMENT OF SERIOUS CARE 
PROBLEMS AND CMS OVERSIGHT WEAKNESS (2008) (finding that “in all but five states, the 
number of state [inspections] with such missed deficiencies was greater than 40 percent [,]” 
and that “[t]he most frequently missed deficiencies identified on comparative [inspections] 
involved poor quality of care”).  
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nursing homes reaped lucrative profits as observable declines occurred in the  care 
that they rendered to residents.88  
III.  THE NURSING HOME INSPECTION SYSTEM 
This section extends the discussion in the previous section on the nursing home 
regulatory regime. Additionally, among other things, it clarifies what role the 
national government has in an issue-area, such as nursing home regulation.  Under 
the scheme of the U.S. federal system, nursing home services are a "local" issue 
vested in the states, rather than a sphere of responsibility entrusted to the national 
government.89 Arguably, the NHRA is a policy designed to promote uniform 
standards across the nation in a key service area under state authority.  Consistent 
with the federal scheme, since the 1950s, state governments have overseen and 
continue to oversee the licensing and certification of nursing homes.90 Since the 
institution of Social Security, the national government has been involved in the 
design and delivery of nursing home services.91 But the programs, more than any 
other, that expanded the national government’s involvement or participation in the 
regulation of nursing home services were Medicare and Medicaid.92 All or part of a 
nursing home may participate in either or both of these two programs.93 Nursing 
                                                          
 88 See See Charles Duhigg, At Many Homes, More Profit and Less Nursing, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 23, 2007) at L1. 
 89 Federalism is understood as “a constitutional division of government power between a 
central or national government and a set of regional units[,]” such as states in the U.S. system.  
MICHAEL E. MILAKOVICH AND GEORGE GORDON, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICA 109 
(10th ed. 2009).  Features of a federal system include that both the national and regional 
governments have some independent as well as some shared powers over their citizens; that 
neither government owes its legal existence to the other; and that as a matter of law, neither 
may dictate to the other(s) regarding structural organization, fiscal policies, or definition of 
essential functions. Id. Under a federal system, the national government and its regional 
components each has sovereignty in the sense that each level can exercise governmental 
powers directly over citizens.  Id.  
 90 See 81 Stat. 823.  See also 85 Stat. 802.  
 91 The formal rules of federalism apart, the national government can interpose itself and 
make regulations on a subject area otherwise “belonging” to the sub-national governments 
where it provides money or other benefits necessary for performance of the service area.  The 
operative principle here, as one adage goes, is that the one who pays the piper dictates the 
tune. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987) (allowing the national 
government to indirectly deal with drunk driving by withdrawing highway funds from states 
who fail to adopt a higher drinking age stipulated by the national government).  The coercive 
hand of the national government is further strengthened by the fact that “the federal 
government raises more tax revenues than do all fifty states and the thousands of local 
governments combined.” THOMAS E. PATTERSON, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 74 (9th ed. 
2009).  This is made possible by its status, compared to the two other levels of government, as 
the government with the most elastic taxing base. See MILAKOVICH AND GORDON, supra 
note 89, at 120-21.     
 92 See Ontario Health Coalition, supra note 3. 
 93 See CHARLENE HARRINGTON ET AL., NURSING FACILITIES, STAFFING, RESIDENTS, AND 
FACILITY DEFICIENCIES, 2001 THROUGH 2007 at 17 (Table 6) (Sept. 2008), accessible at 
http://www.pascenter.org/documents/OSCAR2007.pdf (indicating that 99.9% of nursing 
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homes that participate in the programs become subject to federal requirements 
regarding staffing and quality of care for residents.94 Medicare and Medicaid cover 
more than two-thirds of the nursing home residents in the U.S. at a cost of more than 
$75 billion annually.95 Consistent with U.S. federalism, the nursing home regulatory 
regime and inspection system are embedded in a system of federal-state oversight.  
Under this oversight program, the national government “evaluate[s] the adequacy of 
each state [inspection] agency’s performance in ensuring quality care in nursing 
homes.”96 
Although federalism affords a good explanation of the national government’s 
participation in the nursing home regulatory regime and inspection system, from the 
standpoint of service delivery, the more illuminating concept is intergovernmental 
relations (“IGR”).97 IGR “can be cooperative, competitive, conflicting, or a 
combination of all three.”98 More than constitutional federalism, IGR captures the 
complexities of the regulatory and inspection system, including classification of 
proprietorship of nursing homes, rooted in cooperation, competition, and conflict,  
going beyond the pigeonholes of nation-state and interstate relations, that form the 
central concern of federalism.99 
The federal agency that, in partnership with state governments, administers the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs is the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(“CMMS”).100 In setting up the agency, the national government sought to “establish 
consistency among the regions in the process used to assess” state inspection 
                                                          
facilities participate in one or both programs; 3.2% participate in Medicare only, 2.2.% in 
Medicaid only, and 94.5% in both) (last visited Oct. 2, 2010). 
 94 See id at 1.  
 95 Pear, supra note 84. 
 96 GAO, NURSING HOME CARE: ENHANCED HCFA OVERSIGHT OF STATE PROGRAMS 
WOULD BETTER ENSURE QUALITY, supra note 27, at 3. 
 97 IGR is “[t]he action side of federalism.”  MILAKOVICH AND GORDON, supra note 89, at 
110.  It denominates “an important body of activities or interactions occurring between 
governmental units of all types and levels within the U.S. federal system.”  Id. Specifically, 
IGR embraces “all the permutations and combinations of relations among the units of 
government in our system,” including national-state and interstate-relations (the areas 
traditionally emphasized in the study of federalism), as well as national-local, state-local, 
interlocal, and national-state-local relations.”  See id.; see RICHARD J. STILLMAN II, PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION: CONCEPTS AND CASES 118 (Wadsworth, 9th ed. 2010) (indicating that the 
study of IGR “involves comprehending the complexities of the federal system based on 
mutual interdependence, shared functions, and intertwined influence.”). 
 98 MILAKOVICH AND GORDON, supra note 89, at 111. 
 99 See, e.g., id.  
 100 The organization began its journey as a bureaucracy in 1977 as the Health Care 
Financing Administration (“HCFA”) under the then Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (“HEW”).  Following the split up of HEW in 1980 into two departments (those of 
Education and Health and Human Services), HCFA became an agency under the Department 
of Health and Human Services.  On July 1, 2001, the HCFA changed its name to the CMMS.  
Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, http://www.cms. 
ov/History/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).  
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agencies’ performance.101 To implement federal requirements on Medicare and 
Medicaid relating to nursing home residents, the CMMS issues specific regulations 
that guide inspections of these homes.102 Overall, there are more than 150 regulatory 
standards covering many aspects of resident life, including protection from physical 
or mental abuse, inadequate care practices, and preparation and storage of food, that 
nursing homes must observe at all times.103  
Consistent with its authority over Medicare and Medicaid, the CMMS enters into 
contracts with states, usually through their health department or department of 
human services, which permit these states to monitor nursing homes seeking 
eligibility to provide care to beneficiaries of these two programs.104 These contracts 
specify the protocol of onsite inspections, which determines whether each state's 
nursing homes met the minimum quality and performance standards for Medicare 
and Medicaid.  Under the NHRA and its progeny, states (1) conduct inspections of 
nursing homes within their jurisdiction about once every fifteen months, or more 
frequently, if the nursing home is performing poorly; and (2) investigate complaints 
about nursing home care. 
State inspections take place in teams; each team consists of trained inspectors, 
fire safety specialists, and at least one registered nurse.  The team evaluates whether 
and to what extent each nursing home it inspects meets individual resident needs, 
looking at many aspects of quality, including resident care processes, staff/resident 
interactions, and facility compliance with standards for safe construction, among 
others.  Using an established protocol, the team interviews a sample of residents and 
family members about their lives within the nursing home. It also interviews 
caregivers and administrative staff as well as reviews clinical records.  
When an inspection team finds that a home does not meet a specific regulation, it 
issues a deficiency citation.  Depending on the nature of the problem, the CMMS can 
take action against the nursing home.  Under the NHRA and its progeny, the agency 
can take a variety of actions, including fining the nursing home, denying payment to 
the home, assigning a temporary manager, or installing a state monitor.105 The 
CMMS considers the extent of harm caused by the failure to meet requirements 
when it takes an enforcement action.  Table 2 in the appendix contains a listing of 
the scope of deficiencies along with sanctions attached to those deficiencies.106 As 
the table shows, the scopes could be isolated, evince a pattern, or be widespread; and 
sanctions imposed for violation could be “required” or “optional” (each of which is 
further classified into groups based on severity of the violation involved).107 The 
                                                          
 101  HCFA Regional Offices: Inconsistent, Uneven, and Unfair: Hearing Before the Spec. 
Comm. On Aging, 106th Cong., supra note 28. 
 102 Medicare.gov (Official U.S. Government Site for Medicare), About Nursing Home 
Inspections, available at http://www.medicare.gov/nursing/AboutInspections.asp [hereinafter 
Nursing Home Inspections] (last visited Apr. 24, 2010). 
 103 Id. 
 104 See generally Nursing Home Inspections, supra note 102.  
 105 See supra notes 77-78 and corresponding texts.  
 106 See GAO/HEHS 99-46, NURSING HOMES: ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN 
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL QUALITY STANDARDS, supra note 27.  
 107 Id. 
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table also includes classification for severity broken down into four categories: (1) 
actual or potential for death or serious injury, (2) other actual harm, (3) potential for 
more than minimal harm, or (4) potential for minimal harm.108  The CMMS may 
choose to terminate its agreement with a nursing home where a home cited for 
violation does not correct its deficiency.109 When this occurs, the affected nursing 
home loses its certification to provide care to Medicare and Medicaid residents, 
meaning that these residents must be transferred to another certified facility.110  
To facilitate accomplishment of its inspection role under the nursing home 
regulatory regime, the CMMS is divided into ten regions covering all 50 U.S. states 
and territories (Guam, Puerto Rico, Samoa, and the Virgin Islands).  Each regional 
office has responsibility for the states under its jurisdiction.  Table 4 in the appendix 
contains details on the regional offices: states in each region, number of nursing 
homes in each region, number of regional inspectors, and number of required 
comparative inspections.  To coordinate operations under this complex system, there 
is a Center for Medicaid and State Operations ("CMSO").111  In discharging their 
duties, CMMS regional offices can use one of three inspection techniques: (1) the 
state agency quality improvement program (“QIP”), (2) observation, and (3) 
comparative inspections, or a combination of these three methods.112  Although 
comparative inspections are the most effective technique for monitoring state 
                                                          
 108 Id. 
 109 Id.; see also Nursing Home Inspections, supra note 102. 
 110 Id.; see also Nursing Home Inspections, supra note 102.  
 111 GAO/HEHS 00-6, NURSING HOME CARE: ENHANCED HCFA OVERSIGHT OF STATE 
PROGRAMS WOULD BETTER ENSURE QUALITY, supra note 27.  To demonstrate the sheer 
clearinghouse character of the CMSO, the regional offices are not subordinate to the CMSO.  
Instead, the office and the ten regional offices report directly to a CMSO administrator.  
Differences between the CMSO and the regional offices that cannot be settled informally are 
referred to the CMSO administrator for resolution.  Id.   
 112 Id.  Under the QIP, state inspection agencies conduct self-assessment at least once a 
year to determine if they are in compliance with standards.  A major limitation of this 
technique is that the CMMS regional offices do not independently validate the information 
that the states provide to them; consequently, it is not certain whether or not all serious 
problems were identified and corrected.  For, example, the GAO found that some states were 
not promptly reviewing complaints filed against nursing homes and that those same states had 
not mentioned this problem in their QIP reports.  Id.  Furthermore, the regional offices do not 
have a policy that spells out consequences for noncompliance with the QIP.  Under 
observational inspection, regional inspectors observe state inspectors as they conduct portions 
of their inspections of nursing homes.  This is a technique that the CMMS regional offices 
favor.  See id.  One report by the GAO indicates that in 90% of cases, this is the method 
CMMS regional offices use. Id. Although this technique helps identify state inspectors’ 
training needs, like QIP, it has its own limitations.  One obvious one is that the regional 
inspectors’ presence may make the state inspectors more attentive to their tasks, compared to 
when they were not being observed. Under comparative inspection, CMMS regional 
inspectors inspect some of the nursing homes that the state inspectors evaluated to see if they 
can replicate the state inspectors’ results. This technique requires the CMMS regional office to 
conduct validation inspections of at least 5%  of the Medicare/Medicaid certified nursing 
homes in their region within 2 months of the state inspection teams’ completion of their 
inspections.  Id.    
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inspection agencies,113  this is the method least used by regional inspectors.114 
Instead, as indicated before, these inspectors favor observational inspection.115 
A high level of consistency in the processes used to assess state inspection 
agencies’ performance across the ten regional offices is crucial for ensuring that 
states are being held uniformly accountable to federal standards.116 However, in 
going about their oversight function, CMMS regional offices employ different 
methods that work against the goal of a uniform standard envisaged by the regime of 
state inspections under the NHRA and its progeny.  This occurrence leads to 
variations in oversight across the regions117 that can effectively jeopardize quality 
care provided to residents in nursing homes across the nation.118  Some, such as the 
GAO, have argued that the CMMS has few disciplinary remedies or sanctions at its 
disposal that it could use to prod poor performing state inspection agencies to correct 
widespread problems with the inspection process.119 Yet, it is also true that the 
CMMS does not always put to full effect, the supposedly limited power that the 
agency has at its disposal.  For example, as of 2000, CMMS has only reduced state 
funding once and has never terminated a state inspection agency’s contract.120 
                                                          
 113 For example, one GAO review of 64 cases showed that the regional inspectors found 
more serious deficiencies than the ones identified by the state inspectors in two-thirds of the 
inspections conducted, implying that some state inspectors do not identify serious 
deficiencies.  Id.  
 114  For example, although required by law to inspect 5% of the homes under their 
jurisdiction, according to one GAO report, most of the regional offices only conducted one or 
two comparative inspections per year.  See id.   
 115  See supra note 112. 
 116   GAO/HEHS 00-6, NURSING HOME CARE: ENHANCED HCFA OVERSIGHT OF STATE 
PROGRAMS WOULD BETTER ENSURE QUALITY, supra note 27; HCFA Regional Offices: 
Inconsistent, Uneven, and Unfair: Hearing Before the Spec. Comm. on Aging, 106th Cong., 
supra note 28. 
 117   GAO/HEHS 00-6, NURSING HOME CARE: ENHANCED HCFA OVERSIGHT OF STATE 
PROGRAMS WOULD BETTER ENSURE QUALITY, supra note 27.  
 118 Id.; HCFA Regional Offices: Inconsistent, Uneven, and Unfair: Hearing Before the 
Spec. Comm. on Aging, 106th Cong., supra note 28.  One GAO study found that some regions 
select facilities with no established patterns of deficiencies, while other regions focus on 
facilities that the state inspectors have already identified as having serious deficiencies to 
conduct oversight inspections.  GAO/HEHS 00-6, NURSING HOME CARE: ENHANCED HCFA 
OVERSIGHT OF STATE PROGRAMS WOULD BETTER ENSURE QUALITY, supra note 27.  The 
problem with the latter technique is that regions which use that technique are less likely to 
identify situations in which state inspectors under-reported or overlooked serious deficiencies. 
 119 GAO/HEHS 00-6, NURSING HOME CARE: ENHANCED HCFA OVERSIGHT OF STATE 
PROGRAMS WOULD BETTER ENSURE QUALITY, supra note 27.   
 120 HCFA Regional Offices: Inconsistent, Uneven, and Unfair: Hearing Before the Spec. 
Comm. on Aging, 106th Cong., supra note 28. 
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Strong enforcement of regulations counts.121 Identifying breaches that, because 
they compromise quality of care, warrant a deficiency citation, is critical to the 
nursing home inspection system. Under prevailing law, inspectors’ citation of 
deficiencies influences the types of sanctions imposed on nursing homes.  Of 
particular relevance to this study are external actors who can influence the nursing 
home inspectors’ decisions to cite a deficiency.122 Indications abound that state 
inspectors are not citing deficiencies when serious quality of care problems exist due 
to a range of reasons that includes pressure from external actors.123 
IV.  THE ROLE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS IN THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS 
Public administrators play an important role in the policymaking process.   
Professors Milakovich and Gordon, in their text on public administration in 
America, detailed different stages of agency involvement in policymaking that, 
besides the familiar roles today of rule making, adjudication, law enforcement, and 
program operation, include seemingly political or non-administrative roles such as 
lawmaking.124 The position that bureaucrats have a major role in policymaking was 
not always the conventional wisdom.  Instead, for a long time before now, the view, 
signified by the politics-administration dichotomy, was that agency involvement in 
policy, to the extent that involvement occurred at all, was limited to rote execution of 
policies designed by politicians.  Under the politics-administration dichotomy, "[t]he 
bureaucracy was to administer, in an impartial and nonpolitical fashion, the 
programs created by the legislative branch, subject only to judicial interpretation."125 
Woodrow Wilson epitomized this notion.  Taking as his premise the position that 
running a constitution was becoming harder to manage than framing one, Wilson, in 
his classic essay on the study of administration in America, stressed the need to 
develop effective administrative services free from congressional "meddling."126 To 
him, "[a]dministrative questions are not political questions"; instead public 
administration was a "field of business… removed from the hurry and strife of 
                                                          
 121 See  William D. Spector & Hitomi A. Takada, Characteristics of Nursing Homes that 
Affect Resident Outcomes, 3 J. AGING & HEALTH 427 (1991).  This and other studies suggest 
that instances of poor quality of care occur less in nursing homes where tough sanctions are 
imposed.   
 122 See  GAO 10-70, ADDRESSING THE FACTORS UNDERLYING THE UNDERSTATEMENT OF 
SERIOUS CARE PROBLEMS REQUIRES SUSTAINED CMS AND STATE COMMITMENT, supra note 
11; see also Lucinda M. Deason, Regulatory Enforcement: Do External Environmental 
Factors or Internal Agency Factors Influence State Nursing Home Inspectors’ Activities? 
(2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University).  
 123  See GAO 10-70, ADDRESSING THE FACTORS UNDERLYING THE UNDERSTATEMENT OF 
SERIOUS CARE PROBLEMS REQUIRES SUSTAINED CMS AND STATE COMMITMENT, supra note 11. 
 124 MILAKOVICH AND GORDON, supra note 89, at 432-33.  Regarding lawmaking, 
Milakovich and Gordon contended that "[n]othing of substance would be achieved at [this 
stage] without the advice of bureaucrats, whose expertise is often called upon to draft coherent 
bills.  In addition, policy agendas are forcefully advanced by government agencies. As holders 
of near-monopolistic control of information, agencies have considerable ability to shape 
public opinion and drive legislators to action.”  Id. at 432.  
 125 MILAKOVICH AND GORDON, supra note 89, at 41. 
 126 STILLMAN, supra note 97, at 410.  
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politics," and “[a]lthough politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be 
suffered to manipulate its offices."127  
Subsequent administrative thinkers shared this view.  Leonard D. White, in his 
(otherwise) seminal public administration text, published in 1926, advocated a 
politically-neutral public administration focused exclusively on attainment of 
economy and efficiency in government service.128 Similarly, Goodnow held the view 
that “political control over administrative functions is liable finally to produce 
inefficient administration in that it makes administrative officers feel that what is 
demanded of them is not so much work that will improve their own department, as 
compliance with the behests of the political party.”129  
However, before the politics-administration doctrine took hold in American 
public administration, an alternative worldview evolved regarding the "proper 
relationship" between politics and administration.130  The first shot in the alternative 
view came from Woodruff who, positing that "politics and administration take part 
jointly in every act performed," indicated that, contrary to any dichotomy, the two 
spheres of government "are two parts of the same mechanism, related in much the 
same way as two elements in one chemical compound whose combined qualities 
give the character to the substance."131 The long list of administrative thinkers who, 
more recently, have attacked the politics-administration dichotomy includes the 
distinguished administrative theorist Dwight Waldo.  Waldo concluded, following 
(his characteristically) extensive review of the literature, that "any simple division of 
government into politics-and-administration is inadequate."132  
                                                          
 127 Id.at 10.  Wilson claimed, “Politics is thus the special province of the statesman, 
administration of the technical official.”  Id.  To be sure, “Policy does nothing without the aid 
of administration; but administration is not therefore politics.”  Id.  Having quoted German 
authority on the subject, Wilson stated, “this discrimination between administration and 
politics is now happily too obvious to need further discussion.”  Id.  He asserted that “it is the 
object of administrative study to discover, first, what government can properly and 
successfully do, and, secondly, how it can do these proper things with the utmost possible 
efficiency.” Id. at 6.  To him politics interfered with this goal of efficiency. 
 128 See LEONARD D. WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
(1926); MILAKOVICH AND GORDON, supra note 89, at 41. 
 129 FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION 83 (1900). 
 130 STILLMAN, supra note 97, at 410. 
 131 A NEW MUNICIPAL PROGRAM:  OLD AND NEW 37 (D. Appelton & Co., Clinton R. 
Woodruff ed. 1919). 
 132 DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL THEORY OF 
AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 128 (Ronald, 1948).  Writing more recently, Waldo 
assessed the doctrine as "uninformed, untrue."  DWIGHT WALDO, THE ENTERPRISE OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION: A SUMMARY VIEW 69 (Chandler & Sharp Publishers, Inc., 1980).  He 
remarked that the redesignation of the field to "Public Administration and Public Policy," for 
which he took some credit in achieving, "was a logical and all but inevitable consequence of 
the breakdown of the politics-administration dichotomy." Id. at 63. Other public 
administration scholars who attacked the politics-administration dichotomy were  PAUL H. 
APPLEBY, POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION 170 (Univ. of AL Press, 1949) (arguing that public 
administration is “not autonomous, exclusive or isolated” but rather is a part of policy 
making); James H. Svara, Complementarity of Politics and Administration as a Legitimate 
Alternative to the Dichotomy Model, 30 ADMIN. & SOCIETY 676, 678 (1999) (noting that 
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In sum, the alternative view, regarding the "proper relationship" between politics 
and administration culminated into a “complementarity” model which depicts that 
relationship as "characterized by interdependency, extensive interaction, distinct but 
overlapping roles, political supremacy, and administrative subordination coexisting 
with reciprocity of influence in both policy making and administration."133 
Essentially, administrative agencies influence the policy process and are, in turn, 
influenced by political factors and external actors.134  Not only do public 
administrators play an important role in the policymaking process, their activities 
ultimately impact the health and well-being of nursing home residents.  
V.  POTENTIALLY INFLUENTIAL FACTORS  
The dependent variable or matter under examination in this study is the average 
number of quality of care deficiencies against a nursing home cited by a state or 
regional inspector.  A “deficiency” is an emblem of violation that a state  inspector 
cites "[w]hen a nursing home fails to meet a specific requirement."135 The severities 
of those violations (judged by their capacity for injury to a resident), together with 
scopes (whether isolated, formed a pattern or are widespread) and sanctions for those 
violations, are summarized in Table 2 in the appendix of this article.136  Recall our 
observation that the CMMS maintains a list of over 150 regulatory standards 
covering numerous aspects of a nursing home resident's life.137 One study measured 
these deficiencies to include dietary services, physician services, rehabilitative 
services, dental services, pharmacy services, and infection control, among others.138  
We operationalize deficiencies in this study as the average number of violation 
emblems cited per facility by state (see also description of our variables in Table 5).  
Our independent variables, or the factors we predict affect the dependent variable, 
are political factors, oversight, and affiliation or ownership status of nursing homes.   
                                                          
“there is interdependency and reciprocal influence between elected officials and 
administrators in policy making”). 
 133 Svara, supra note 132, at 678. 
 134 In this study, then, we seek to isolate and measure the political factors that influence 
inspectors enforcing the nursing home regulatory regime and inspection system.  To be on the 
safe side, we limit our measurement of political factors narrowly to political party affiliation.  
In so doing, we do not dispute that other factors involved in this study, such as oversight, and 
affiliation of nursing homes, are embedded within the wider framework of politics, for they 
are.  Back to the days of Harold Lasswell, political scientists have defined politics as the 
struggle over “who gets what, when, and how.”  HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS 
WHAT, WHEN, HOW (1938).  It is “the process through which a society settles its conflicts and 
decides the policies by which it will be governed.”  PATTERSON, supra note 91, at 12.  
 135  OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OEI-20-00600, 
NURSING HOME DEFICIENCY TRENDS AND SURVEY AND CERTIFICATION PROCESS CONSISTENCY 
(2003), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-00600.pdf . 
 136 See also supra notes 106-108 and corresponding texts. 
 137 See supra note 103 and corresponding text.  
 138 Charlene Harrington et al., Does Investor Ownership of Nursing Homes Compromise 
the Quality of Care? 32 INT’L J. HEALTH SCI. 315 (2002) [hereinafter Harrington et al., 2002 
Article]. 
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The discussion that follows involves a review of each of the three variables 
critical to this study.139 For each variable, the conversation embraces a survey of 
previous scholarship relating to the variable, definition and operationalization of key 
term or terms, theses and underlying assumptions, and results. Before we get into 
that discussion, a brief general comment on our methodology and results will be 
provided. To ascertain whether a statistically significant relationship exists between 
our dependent and independent variables, we ran a regression analysis, using data 
drawn from all U.S. states, excluding Nebraska, which has a one-chamber 
legislature.140 The results of our regression analysis are summarized in Table 1.141 A 
                                                          
 139 Table 5 in the appendix also summarizes the set of variables we used in this study. 
 140 We employed a longitudinal cross-sectional design utilizing annual panel data for the 
nine-year period from 1995 through 2004.  The estimate of our regression model is as follows: 
Deficienciesi,t = C + Political Factorsi,t (Governori,t + State Legislaturei,t) + Oversighti,t (CMS’ 
ten Regional Officesi,t)  + Nursing Home Affiliationi,t (Chaini,t + Hospitali,t) + Time Controlst 
(1995t + 1996t + 1997t + 1998t + 1999t + 2000t + 2001t + 2002t + 2003t + 2004t) + ei,t where “i” 
represents the states and “t” the year.  In estimating our regression model, we used a fixed 
group and time effect model fitted with least square dummy variables.  But such measures are 
bedeviled by the assumptions of independently distributed error terms (no autocorrelation) and 
constant error variance across observations (homoscedasticity).  Data used in this study tended 
to violate these assumptions, thereby creating problems of autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity, that could result in false inferences. To get around these problems, in 
estimating our regression model, we used Cochrane-Orcutt and Glejser procedures to test, 
respectively, for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Our tests revealed the presence of 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, which problem we then corrected by applying a robust 
estimation procedure on an autoregressive model using a lagged dependent variable (to 
estimate the time effect).  With respect to data collection, the information for our political 
factor variables (measured narrowly in terms of political party affiliation) was taken from the 
World Almanac and Book of Facts for the years 1995 through 2004. See THE WORLD 
ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS (Scripps Howard Co., multiple years). We set aside 
Region 9 (encompassing California) under the CMMS administrative classification of U.S. 
states and  territories in the inspection system, as a reference and comparison category. While 
problems with oversight of state inspection agencies are not limited to California, our 
reasoning in secluding Region 9, comprising this vast state, as the comparison category, is that 
it is a region whose problems have been extensively studied and documented. See, e.g., 
GAO/HEHS 98-202, CALIFORNIA NURSING HOMES: CARE PROBLEMS PERSIST DESPITE 
FEDERAL AND STATE OVERSIGHT, supra note 27.  To increase reliability in our findings, and 
hold constant, extraneous factors other than the variables we selected for examination that 
could affect our dependent variable, we included controls for time, using dummy variables, 
for the period 1995 through 2004.  For nursing home affiliation or ownership status, we 
obtained our data from Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting System ("OSCAR"), a 
network of statistics, managed by the CMMS, which covers almost every nursing home in the 
U.S. OSCAR contains ongoing information on all Medicare and Medicaid certified nursing 
homes in the U.S., including data on deficiency citations inputted by state agencies and 
nursing homes.  OSCAR data group ownership status of nursing homes into three categories: 
non-profit, government-affiliated, and for-profit ownership.  See  Will Mitchell et al., The 
Commercialization of Nursing Home Care: Does For-Profit Cost-Control Mean Lower 
Quality or Do Corporations Provide the Best of Both Worlds?  (Sept. 17, 2004), available at 
http://www.caseatduke.org/documents/FPvNP_NursingHomes_mitchell.pdf (last visited Jul. 
16, 2010). Our focus in this study is on for-profit and non-profit ownerships, which two 
categories, between them, comprise 94% of all U.S. nursing homes.  
24 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 24:1 
 
recapitulation of the results involving all of the six theses we examined in the study 
is provided at the end of this section. 
 
Table 1. Estimated Model of Factors that Influence Citation of Deficiencies in 
Nursing Homes, 1995 through 2004142 
Quality of Care – Deficiencies                                                                                                  
   Coefficients143    (S.E.)             t-value  
Regional/Spatial Controls (Administrative Oversight) 
Region 1        -1.216   (.334)            -3.64 *** 
Region 2        -1.144   (.444)           -2.58 *** 
Region 3           -.888   (.278)               -3.19 *** 
Region 4           -.524  (.239)               -2.20 ** 
Region 5         -1.055  (.287)               -3.68 *** 
Region 6           -.699  (.276)               -2.54 ** 
Region 7           -.578   (.308)               -1.88 * 
Region 8           -.736   (.265)               -2.78 *** 
Region 10           -.315   (.268)                 -1.18  
  
Executive Oversight 
Democratic Governor           -.055   (.112)                 -0.50 
 
Legislative Oversight 
Unified Democratic  
Legislature              .246   (.150)                   1.65 * 
Split Legislature            .115   (.148)                   0.78 
 
 
 
                                                          
 141 The results indicated that our F-Test yielded a statistically significant result (F (23, 439) 
= 22.30) and that our model accounted for (or "explained") over 51%  of the variation in 
inspectors' citation of deficiencies.  Additionally, consistent with our predictions, we found 
variations in the number of deficiencies, measured in averages, cited by nursing home 
inspectors over the years and across the states.  As shown in Table 5 in the appendix, while, 
on average, nursing home inspectors cited about 6 deficiencies a year per state (M = 6.08, SD 
= 2.65), there were instances where the citations were as low as about 2 deficiencies per year 
in a state and as high as about 16 deficiencies per year.  The lag number of average 
deficiencies cited ranged from an average of 1.5 to 18.4 with a mean score of 5.84 (SD = 
2.56).  A comparison of the deficiencies’ mean  in 1995 with the mean of the lag of 
deficiencies indicates that fewer deficiencies were cited over the period 1996 to 2004.  While 
citing fewer deficiencies after 1995 might be attributed to several factors, including improved 
oversight of the state inspection process, it might also point to more compliance and improved 
quality of care.  However, this conclusion is doubtful considering that state inspectors have 
been found to overlook or understate serious problems with quality of care in nursing homes. 
See GAO 10-70, ADDRESSING THE FACTORS UNDERLYING THE UNDERSTATEMENT OF SERIOUS 
CARE PROBLEMS REQUIRES SUSTAINED CMS AND STATE COMMITMENT, supra note 11.    
 142 The state of Nebraska was not included in this model because it has a unicameral 
legislature 
 143 N = 463 
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Table 1. Estimated Model of Factors that Influence Citation of Deficiencies in 
Nursing Homes, 1995 through 2004 (Continued). 
Quality of Care – Deficiencies                                                                                                  
   Coefficients    (S.E.)             t-value   
Facility Affiliation 
Hospital            -.002   (.006)       -0.38     
Chain            -.012   (.006)       -1.89 * 
 
Time Controls 
1996            -.411   (.214)        -1.92 *  
1997             .248   (.221)         1.12  
1998             .710    (.222)       3.20 ***  
1999                          .892   (.220)            4.06 ***  
2000             .779   (.219)            3.56 ***  
 2001                           .996   (.216)            4.60 ***  
2002             .499   (.217)            2.30 **  
2003                         1.836   (.214)            8.59 *** 
2004            2.781   (.211)           13.15 *** 
 
Lag of Deficiencies                         .794   (.026)              30.99 ***  
Intercept Term             1.468   (.572)                  2.57 **  
 F (df)   F (23, 439) = 22.30 *** 
 Adjusted R2  .5147 
Note: Significance at the 0.01 level, 0.05, and 0.10 level is indicated by ***, **, and 
*, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
A.  Political Factors 
1.  Survey of Previous Scholarship 
“Political factors” is a broad concept, whose definition, as stated earlier, we 
restrict in this study to the orientations and proclivities of the two major political 
parties in the U.S.144 regarding nursing home regulations.  Nursing home policy in 
                                                          
 144 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.  The U.S. has a strong two-party system 
where, more than is the case in other two-party systems (such as Britain), the Democratic and 
Republican Parties dominate the political and electoral landscape.  See KENNETH JANDA ET 
AL., THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 227, 229 (10th ed. 2009).  
See also PATTERSON, supra note 91, at 199 (stating that, in the U.S. two-party system, the 
Democratic and Republican Parties today are the only two parties “with a realistic chance of 
acquiring political control.”). The activities, dispositions, and/or positions of these two major 
parties do not exhaust the universe of political forces in the U.S., but they monopolize those 
forces.  For although many Americans identify themselves as “independents” (i.e., disinclined 
from either of these two parties) and numerous parties have evolved over the years that tap 
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this country is marked by enduring tension between regulation and market-based 
approaches.145 The goal still is how to assure high-quality of care and high-quality of 
life for nursing home residents.  While for some individuals and groups, the means 
to this goal is regulation, for others that route is market-based techniques.  Again, 
our focus is on the orientations of the two political parties.  The Democratic Party 
tends to favor regulations, while the Republican Party tends to disfavor them.  
Specifically, the Democratic Party tends to introduce new regulatory measures and 
support strong enforcement of regulations in place, while the Republican Party tends 
to oppose new regulations or works to reduce costs associated with enforcing laws 
on nursing home care. With respect to the Republican Party, Americans for 
Democratic Action, an advocate for nursing home care, took this position in 2005, 
commenting on nursing home policy under President George W. Bush, which it 
surmised to have “gone awry.”146  The group accused the U.S. Congress, at the time 
controlled by the Republican Party, of not appropriating sufficient funds to enforce 
the NHRA, not providing funding for personnel and training necessary for proper 
inspection of nursing homes, and of not doing much to promote effective sanctions 
against non-compliant nursing homes, among other charges.147   
Still at the national level, the attitudes of recent Republican Party presidents bear 
out similar antipathy toward regulation.  Although the NHRA was passed during his 
period in office, Ronald Reagan was noted for an opposition to regulation that was 
so far-flung in spectrum it included advocacy for deregulation.  His administration 
contemplated eliminating nursing home residents’ rights, as a condition for 
participation by facilities in Medicare and Medicaid, and also favored weak 
inspections that would have allowed nursing homes to survey themselves and  less 
frequently too.148 To crown things off, the NHRA was passed unobtrusively toward 
the dying end of the Reagan administration, as part of a budget reconciliation 
process with Congress, controlled by the Democratic Party, a technique in the social 
security field initiated with the Boren Amendment149 that George H. W. Bush, who 
succeeded Reagan as president, also used. George H. W. Bush meant his 
administration to be a “kinder, gentler” version of the Reagan government, under 
which he served for eight years as vice president from 1981 to 1989, and his attitude 
toward regulations was therefore merely Reagan-lite.150  Although George W. Bush 
                                                          
into this “independent” mood, these third parties, through their platforms or postures, maintain 
some degree of affiliation to one of the two major parties. 
 145 Ontario Health Coalition, supra note 3. 
 146 See AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION, 14 THE NURSING HOME CRISIS: PUBLIC 
POLICY GONE AWRY (2005), available at http://www.adaction.org/ pages/issues/all-policy-
resolution/social-amp-domestic/140-the-nursing-home-crisis-public-policy-gone-awry.php 
 147 Id. 
 148 See supra notes 64-65 and corresponding texts.   
 149 See supra notes 52-53 and corresponding texts.  Another instance, under Reagan, that 
besides these two, involved the use of this technique in social security legislation was 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. 99-509 (1986). See generally GEOFFRY 
KOLLMAN AND CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, SOCIAL SECURITY: MAJOR DECISIONS IN THE HOUSE 
AND SENATE 1935-2000 (Novinka Books, 2002).  
 150 Instances under the first Bush administration involving the use of budget reconciliation 
to achieve passage of social security legislation were the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 
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is remembered for expanding Medicare, through the addition of an outpatient 
prescription drug benefit for elderly citizens,151 he shared the same general attitude 
of preceding Republican Party governments toward regulation.  Additionally, Bush’s 
failed attempt to privatize social security,152 an occurrence that bore out the revulsion 
against regulation that he shared with the two previous Republican-led governments, 
is probably the reason that some observers denominate his nursing home regulation 
orientation as a "market-based approach."153  
In contrast, William J. Clinton, who was elected under the platform of the 
Democratic Party, strongly favored regulation of nursing homes.154 In 1995, with his 
presidential veto power, he repulsed the attempt by the 104th Congress, under 
Republican Party control, to repeal the NHRA.155  Under Clinton, the 105th Congress, 
led by the Republican Party, in 1997, repealed the Boren Amendment.156 The same 
Congress passed the Balanced Budget Reconciliation Act that cut the amount of 
money Medicare pays nursing homes, an occurrence that triggered the bankruptcy of 
four or five large nursing home chains.157 Moreover, in 1998 and 2000, Clinton 
unveiled numerous proposals designed to improve the enforcement of existing 
nursing home laws.158 A similar attitude in favor of regulation is perceivable under 
the current Obama administration.  Given the financial and housing problems that 
helped usher him into office, crises that Obama himself blamed on lax regulatory 
oversight,159 some analysts predict for his government an attitude toward regulation 
                                                          
Pub. L. 101-239 (1989); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. 101-508 (1990); 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. 103-66 (1993). See KOLLMAN AND SOLOMON-
FEARS, supra note 149.  
 151 See supra note 41. 
 152 See, e.g. PATTERSON, supra note 91, at 245-46. 
 153 The President’s Budget Proposal Would Eliminate Medicare As We Know It, Center for 
Medicare Advocacy, Inc., http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/InfoByTopic/Reform/reform 
_pres_proposal.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).   
 154 New Gao Report Demonstrates Need for Stronger Enforcement of Nursing Home 
Quality Standards:  Health Reform Provisions Could Help, Center for Medicare Advocacy, 
Inc. (May 20, 2010), http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/InfoByTopic/SkilledNursingFacility/ 
10_05.20.GAOonSNFEnforcement.htm. 
 155 See Brief History of Long-term Care supra note 5. 
 156 Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 1851, 111 Stat. 251.  See also 
supra notes 52-53 and corresponding texts. 
 157 Evolution of Nursing Home Care, supra note 5.  The specific provision here involved is 
Title IV, § 1851. 
 158 For 1998, see President Clinton Announces Initiative to Improve the Quality of Nursing 
Home Care, White House Fact Sheet, Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. Press Office (July 21, 
1998), accessible at http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/1998pres/98072/c.html (last visited Jul. 
16, 2010); for 2000, see Older Americans Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-501, 
114 Stat. 2226.  See also supra note 82 and corresponding text.  
 159 See, e.g. THOMAS R. DYE ET AL., OBAMA: YEAR ONE 85-94 (2010). 
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of nursing homes so strong it will amount to “re-regulation.”160  True to the 
prediction of an orientation toward strong regulation, as part of his overhaul of the 
healthcare system, under Obama, the 111th Congress, in 2010, passed a set of three 
laws designed to strengthen the nursing home regulatory scheme.161  The laws are (1) 
the Nursing Home Transparency and Improvement Law, (2) Elder Justice Act, and 
(3) Patient Safety and Abuse Prevention Act.162      
Shifting our focus momentarily to the states, the center of gravity of nursing 
home inspections, political chief executives also use their appointment powers to 
influence regulatory agencies.  For example, one 1991 study found political 
appointment to be, for modern chief executives, governors included, a key 
mechanism of political control that ranks over and above changing budgets, 
legislation, congressional signals, and administrative reorganization.163  These 
executives choose political appointees for reasons that include these appointees' 
ability to implement their programs.164 As with the national level, political affiliation 
also matters here; governors elected under the label of the Democratic Party tend to 
favor regulation, while those elected under the label of the Republican Party tend to 
oppose regulation in favor of deregulation or “market-based” techniques.165  
                                                          
 160 Why Health Care Reform is Good for Medicare Beneficiaries, Center for Medicare 
Advocacy, Inc. (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/InfoByTopic/Reform/ 
Reform_09_09.10.HCreformisGOODforMedicare.htm. 
 161 President Obama Signs Elder Justice Act And Nursing Home Transparency and 
Improvement Act Into Law, California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform, available at 
http://www.canhr.org/newsroom/newdev_archive/2010/ObamaSignsElderJusticeAct.html 
[hereinafter CA Advocates for Nursing Home Reform] (last visited May 22, 2010).      
 162 Id. The last created a national program of criminal background checks on employees of 
long-term care providers with access to residents of facilities or people receiving care in their 
own homes. Id. All three laws are embedded in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).   
 163 See B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political-Bureaucratic 
Adaptation, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 497-528 (1991). 
 164 See, e.g., John T. Scholz, Jim Twombly & Barbara Headrick, Street-Level Political 
Controls Over Federal Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 829 (1991) (focusing on state 
environmental protection agencies).  
 165 The reader might wonder why the Democratic Party seemingly stands with underdogs, 
such as poor elderly citizens, while the Republican Party appears to take things, like good care 
and quality life, away from them.  The solicitude is a zeal borne out of altruism: after all, true 
to the devotion embedded in the preamble of the U.S. constitution regarding promotion of the 
“general welfare,” U.S. political parties seek to “give voters a chance to influence the 
direction of the government.”  PATTERSON, supra note 91, at 213 (providing a definition of 
political parties).  But it is also a solicitude rooted in realist calculations. The Democratic 
Party draws its supporters from economically vulnerable groups in society, including elderly 
persons, although recently elderly voters have “split their vote about evenly between the [two] 
parties.” Id. at 223.  In contrast, the Republican Party “has historically been the party of tax 
cuts and business incentives” that draws its support mainly from “white middle class 
Protestants,” persons living in the suburbs, and persons from regions “where traditional values 
and a desire for lower taxes and less government regulation of economic activity are most 
pronounced.”  Id. at 224.    
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2.  Definition and Operationalization of Key Terms.  
We stated earlier that, for this study, we measure "political factors" narrowly 
around the orientation of the two major political parties toward nursing home 
regulations.166  Additionally, we make clear that, although our review of previous 
scholarship on this variable refers to political party events at both the national and 
state levels, our level of analysis in this study,167 and to which level we limited our 
data collection, is the state.  This is because of data constraints, but even more 
importantly because the inspection system that forms our object of inquiry in this 
study is largely state-based.  
There are two integral elements to the political party affiliation ("PPA") variable 
used in this study: affiliation of the governor ("governor"), and affiliation of the 
legislature ("legislature").  The governor is a categorical measure coded “0” for the 
Republican Party and “1” for the Democratic Party (see Table 5 in the appendix).  
We excluded governors identified as independents from the analysis.  The 
legislature is a dummy variable operationalized in terms of whether or not both 
chambers of the legislature were controlled by the Democratic Party or the 
Republican Party (see Table 5). For this variable, there were altogether three 
categories: (1) states with a legislature dominated or controlled by the Democratic 
Party, (2) states with a legislature dominated or controlled by the Republican Party, 
and (3) states where neither of the two political parties has achieved domination or 
maintained a majority.  This last scenario or possibility occurs within the context of 
a bicameral legislature where either the Democratic or Republican Party controls one 
chamber of the legislature, while the other party controls the other.  Consistent with 
the admonition in statistical research regarding dummy variables,168 one of these 
three scenarios, namely, legislatures dominated or controlled by the Republican 
Party, was used as the comparison category.  Because Nebraska has a unicameral 
legislature, the state was excluded from the analysis and our database covered the 
remaining 49 states of the union.   
3.  Theses and Underlying Assumptions, and Results.  
No. 1. States with governors affiliated with the Democratic Party are more 
likely to experience more citation of deficiencies, compared to states with 
governors affiliated with the Republican Party.  
 The assumption underlying this thesis is that, compared to the Republican Party, 
officials of the Democratic Party, including governors, are more predisposed to 
strong enforcement of regulations that turn into citations of deficiencies. In the 
nursing home setting, this strong predisposition includes a greater willingness to 
provide funding for enforcement of nursing home regulations.  In contrast, members 
of the Republican Party, including governors, have a tendency to block or blunt 
strong enforcement of nursing home regulations.  As one interest group poignantly 
                                                          
 166 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.  It should be clear that in so doing, we do 
not suggest that party affiliation exhausts the universe of political factors, for it does not.  To 
the contrary, all the variables we test in this study may, equally, be denominated "political." 
 167 For an elaboration of the concept, levels of analysis, in political science, see BRUCE 
RUSSETT ET AL., WORLD POLITICS: THE MENU FOR CHOICE 10-16 (6th ed. 2000).    
 168 See DAMODAR N. GUJARATI, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMETRICS 257 (1992). 
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pointed out, referring to Republican members of the U.S. Congress, such "rearguard" 
actions could include not appropriating sufficient funds to enforce a law, not 
providing funding for personnel and training necessary for proper inspection of 
nursing homes, and not doing much to promote effective sanctions against non-
compliant nursing homes, among other steps.169 There is not enough evidence from 
our study to support this hypothesis.  Instead, contrary to our expectation, the result 
showed that states with governors affiliated with the Democratic Party experienced 
fewer citations of deficiencies than states with governors affiliated with the 
Republican Party. However, at b = -.055, p > .10, the observed difference is not 
statistically significant.  
No. 2. States with legislatures dominated or controlled by the Democratic 
Party are more likely to experience a higher number of deficiency 
citations, compared to states with legislatures dominated or controlled by 
the Republican Party.      
 The assumption underlying this thesis is the same as that for thesis No. 1 above.  
The premise, applicable also to thesis No. 1, is that from a general standpoint, the 
Republican Party and its officials, including state legislators, tend to favor less 
regulation of nursing homes  or to toss off "rearguard" obstacles in the way of 
existing regulations, while the Democratic Party tends to initiate those regulations 
and/or support stronger enforcement of the ones already on the books. Our 
regression analyses bore out this result and, at the 90% level, the finding was 
statistically significant.      
No. 3. States with legislatures whose control is split (in the sense that each 
major political party controls one chamber of the legislature) are more 
likely to experience a higher number of deficiency citations, compared to 
states with legislatures dominated or controlled by the Republican Party.   
 The assumption underlying this thesis is that full control of the legislature, 
signified by a legislature dominated or controlled by the Republican Party, in our 
comparison variable, is necessary for large numbers of deficiency citations, but that 
the likelihood for high deficiency citations slips away even with the least loss of 
control evident in a legislature with split control.  There is not enough evidence from 
our study, based on our regression analysis, to support this thesis. 
B.  Oversight 
Oversight in this study is a concept we tie inextricably to nursing home 
inspection.  Much of the analysis in the last subsection relating to political party 
affiliation applies here.  In other words, just as with regulation, oversight of nursing 
homes is stronger under governments controlled by the Democratic Party, both at the 
national and state levels, compared to governments controlled by the Republican 
Party. The reader should also note that, from a broader perspective, enforcement, 
touched upon repeatedly in this article, encompasses oversight. The term is measured 
as a set of regional/spatial variables that isolates and holds out CMMS region 9, 
encompassing the state of California, the focus of numerous GAO studies analyzing 
the problems with the inspection system, as the comparison category.   
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No. 4. Deficiency citations in regional offices 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10 
will be different from citation of deficiencies in regional office 9.  
 Evidence from our study confirmed this hypothesis. Our regression results 
showed that, compared to region 9, all of the other CMMS regions reported fewer 
citations of deficiencies, and the differences in citation of deficiencies were 
statistically significant, except for Region 10, comprising Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, 
and Washington. Regions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 8, were statistically significant at the 99% 
level; 4 and 6 were statistically significant at the 95% level; and 7 was statistically 
significant at the 90% level. Several factors, including differences in budgetary 
allocations, quality and size of inspection staff, inconsistent standards of evaluation 
from region to region, time spent on oversight inspections, and different methods for 
conducting oversight inspections, might account for the variations in citation of 
deficiencies across regions.  Oversight influences inspectors’ citation of deficiencies.  
Accordingly, with the spotlight placed on problems of nursing home oversight in 
California, it is possible that Region 9, encompassing California, may have tightened 
its oversight inspection process, an occurrence that probably accounted for the 
region's citing more deficiencies than the other regions.  
C.  Affiliation or Ownership Status of Nursing Homes 
1.  Survey of Previous Scholarship 
Do for-profit and not-for-profit nursing homes “behave differently?”170 Two-
thirds of the estimated 16,000 nursing homes in the U.S. are owned by for-profit 
organizations, the rest by non-profit or government-owned entities.171 Following the 
introduction of Medicare and Medicaid and before the passage of the NHRA in 
1987, a growth occurred in the number of for-profit nursing facilities owned by large 
chains.172 The trend continued following enactment of the NHRA, such that, between 
1991 and 1997, the percentage of nursing homes owned by multi-unit chain 
organizations increased from 39% to 43%.173  Long before the passage of the NHRA 
in 1987, the relationship between ownership status of nursing homes and quality of 
care has been an issue of enormous interest and versed discussion in the literature.174 
While some of these studies found “behavioral differences” in quality of care tied to 
                                                          
 170 See William E. Aaronson et al., Do For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Nursing Homes 
Behave Differently? 34 GERONTOLOGIST 775 (1994). 
 171 The numbers break down into about 67% by for-profit organizations, 27% by non-profit 
organizations, and 6% by government and other entities. See Pear, supra note 84; Nursing 
Homes, supra note 1. 
 172 See D.W. Light, Corporate Medicine for Profit, 255  SCI. AM. 555 (1986). 
 173 See Jane Banaszak-Holl et al., Comparing Service and Quality among Chain and 
Independent U.S. Nursing Homes during the 1990s (2002), http://www.caseatduke.org 
/documents/nh_servicequality_mitchell.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2010).  
 174 See Peter W. Shaughnessy et al., Case Mix and Surrogate Indicators of Quality of Care 
Over Time in Freestanding and Hospital-Based Nursing Homes in Colorado, 98 PUB. 
HEALTH REP. 486 (1983); S. Winn and K.M. McCaffree, Characteristics of Nursing Homes 
Perceived to be Effective and Efficient, 16 GERONTOLOGIST 415 (1976); R. Hopkins 
Holmberg and Nancy N. Anderson, Implications of Ownership for Nursing Home Care, 6  
MED. CARE 300 (1968). 
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affiliation status, others uncovered no such linkage.  One of the studies in the first 
category, by Shaughnessy and colleagues, found that nursing homes affiliated with 
hospitals afforded better quality of care compared to freestanding nursing homes.175 
Another study, by Greene and Monahan, compared for-profit and other types of 
nursing homes and found quality in for-profit homes to be lower.176 Among studies 
in the latter category were those by Winn and McCaffree,177 as well as Holmberg and 
Anderson,178 both of which found little difference in the quality of care provided by 
for-profits nursing homes, compared to not-for-profit facilities.  
In the aftermath of the NHRA, studies conducted by the Department of Health 
and Human Services found that nursing homes owned by for-profit organizations 
received the most citation for deficiencies, compared to those owned by non-profit 
organizations or the government.  For example, in 2007, 94% of for-profit nursing 
homes were cited for deficiencies, compared to 91% of homes owned by the 
government, and 88% of nonprofit homes.179 Similarly, for-profit nursing homes 
accumulated a higher average number of deficiencies than the other categories of 
nursing homes.  According to the Health and Human Services report, for-profit 
nursing homes averaged 7.6 deficiencies per home, compared to 5.7 deficiencies for 
nonprofit homes, and 6.3deficiencies  for homes owned by the government.180  
According to a New York Times study, two things for-profit nursing homes 
(especially those run by large private investment companies) do that have a negative 
effect on nursing home care are (1) cutting costs, and (2) using ownership devices, 
such as complicated corporate structures. These tactics insulate companies from 
costly lawsuits because they make it difficult for plaintiffs, damaged by low-quality 
                                                          
 175 Shaughnessy et al., supra note 174. 
 176 V.L. Greene and D. Monaham, Structural and Operational Factors Affecting Quality of 
Patient Care in Nursing Homes, 29 PUB. POL’Y 399 (1981). 
 177 Winn and McCaffree, supra note 174. 
 178 Holmberg and Anderson, supra note 174. 
 179 Pear, supra note 84. The reader should note that, while the figure for government-
owned homes seems high at 91%, these homes, as already indicated (see supra text 
accompanying note 171), make up only 6%  of the 16,000 nursing facilities in the U.S.   
 180 Pear, supra note 84. For similar findings, see also Margaret J. McGregor et al., Staffing 
Levels in Not-For-Profit and For-Profit Long-Term Care Facilities: Does Type of Ownership 
Matter? 172  CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 645 (2005); Ciaran O’Neill et al., Quality of Care in 
Nursing Homes: An Analysis of Relationships Among Profit, Quality and Ownership, 41  
MED. CARE1318 (2003); Banaszak-Holl et al., supra note 173; Charlene Harrington et al., 
Does Investor Ownership of Nursing Homes Compromise the Quality of Care? 91 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 1452 (2001) [hereinafter Harrington et al., 2001 Article]; Harrington et al., 
2002 Article, supra note 138. See also William D. Spector et al., The Impact of Ownership 
Type on Nursing Home Outcomes, 7 HEALTH ECON. 639 (1998); Aaronson et al., supra note 
170; Mark A. Davis, Nursing Home Ownership Revisited: Market, Cost, and Quality 
Relationships, 31 MED. CARE 1062 (1993). Not only did Harrington and her colleagues 
uncover that not-for-profit facilities afforded more quality care than for-profit homes, they 
also found that these non-profits have higher staffing levels, compared to their for-profit 
counterparts.  See Harrington et al. 2001 Article, supra.   
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care, to bring suit.181 Concerning the first, Professor Harrington of the University of 
California in San Francisco, who has studied nursing homes extensively and some of 
whose works we used in building our argument in this piece, was quoted as stating 
that "[t]he first thing [these private] owners do is lay off nurses and other staff that 
are essential to keeping patients safe."182 Harrington added instructively that these 
"chains have made a lot of money by cutting nurses, but it's at the cost of human 
lives."183 
A recent incident that has stimulated a flare-up in the debate regarding the 
possible influence of ownership status on nursing home care is the takeover of large 
chains by private equity firms.184 One such takeover that drew tremendous public 
and governmental attention was the buy-out of Manor Care, the nation’s largest 
nursing home chain, for $6.3 billion.185 The firm engaged in this takeover was the 
Carlyle Group, which was reputed to be politically connected.186 Advocates for 
nursing home residents believe that such takeovers have a negative impact on the 
quality of care.187 They argue, for example, that such takeovers result in windfalls 
that do not benefit nursing home residents.188 Advocates of the nursing home 
industry (including lobbyists for equity firms like the Carlyle Group) rebut that there 
is no evidence that private equity ownership negatively impacts care.189 Instead, in 
the words of one lobbyist for the American Health Care Association (“AHCA”), 
“[t]he focus should be on staffing and decision making, instead of who owns the 
building.”190 Congress has held hearings on private equity firms,191 and as of 2008, 
                                                          
 181 Duhigg, supra note 88; see also Joseph E. Casson and Julia McMillen, Protecting 
Nursing Home Companies: Limiting Liability through Corporate Restructuring, 36 J. 
HEALTH L. 577 (2003). 
 182 Duhigg, supra note 88.  
 183 Id. 
 184 Trends in Nursing Home Ownership and Quality: Hearing of the Subcommittee on 
Health House Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 29. 
 185 See Samuel Loewenberg, Nursing Home Industry Fights Reforms, POLITICO.COM 
(May 27, 2008), http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=26AD3B21-3048-5C12-
00AC70E7B99A977D. 
 186 See id.  
 187 See Duhigg, supra note 88; Loewenberg , supra note 185.   
 188 Following the buyout of Manor Care by a private equity firm, the CEO of the company 
was to receive $118-$186 million.  The Center for Medicare Advocacy, an advocacy group, 
calculated how many nursing staff (gristmill for nursing care delivery), that the windfall 
would have paid for: $118 m would have hired 5,346 certified nursing assistants (CNAs) and 
2,198 registered nurses (RNs), while $186 m would have purchased 8,427 CNAs and 3,464 
RNs.  See Letter from Toby S. Edelman, Center for Medicare Advocacy, California Advocates 
for Nursing Home Reform, to Editor, Center for Medicare Advocacy, Inc. (July 2007), 
accessible at http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/Commentary_SNFCEOsWindfall.htm. 
 189 See Loewenberg, supra note 185. 
 190 Id, quoting David E. Hebert, former Chief of Staff for then-Majority Whip Roy Blunt 
(Republican from Missouri and now an AHCA lobbyist). 
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proposed legislation that will deal with the possible effect of private equity 
ownership on nursing home quality, including the requirement of more transparency 
in ownership structure of nursing homes, which private equity firms strongly oppose.  
This bill, sponsored by Senator Herb (Democrat from Wisconsin) and Senator Chuck 
Grassley (Republican from Iowa), among others, became the Nursing Home 
Transparency and Improvement Act that President Obama signed into law, as part of 
his healthcare overhaul, in March of 2010.192 
2. Definition and Operationalization of Key Terms.  
Affiliation or ownership status of nursing homes refers to the ownership status or 
identity of a nursing home; whether, for example, as we indicated in our survey of 
previous studies, such a facility is owned by a for-profit, non-profit, or government-
owned entity.  Two ownership categories this study used are non-profit hospital-
affiliated and for-profit chain-affiliated nursing homes. Hospital affiliation was 
operationalized as the percentage of certified hospital-based facilities in a state by 
year (see Table 5). Chain affiliation was operationalized as the percentage of 
certified facilities that were owned or leased by multi-facility organizations in a state 
by year (see Table 5). 
 3.  Theses and Underlying Assumptions, and Results. 
Thesis No. 5.  Citation of deficiencies by inspectors will decrease with 
increases in the percentage of hospital-affiliated nursing homes by state 
and year. 
 
Thesis No. 6.  Citation of deficiencies by inspectors will increase with 
increases in the percentage of chain-affiliated nursing homes by state and 
year. 
 The general assumption underlying these theses is that, compared to hospital-
affiliated nursing homes, nursing homes owned by chains are more likely to engage 
in cost-cutting maneuvers, designed to increase their profits, that work against 
quality care.193 These measures include laying off nurses and other paramedical 
personnel who are necessary to keep residents safe, and working to insulate 
themselves from costly lawsuits by utilizing dubious (if not devious) ownership 
devices.  These tactics increase the likelihood of lower-quality care being provided 
to residents and make it difficult for residents damaged by incompetent  care or their 
relatives to bring legal action.194  
Our finding supported thesis No. 5, although, intriguingly, the result was not 
statistically significant. Regarding thesis No. 6, our regression analyss uncovered a 
                                                          
 191 See House Ways and Means Committee, supra note 29; Nursing Home Transparency 
and Improvement, U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging (Nov. 15, 2007), available at 
http://aging.senate.gov/hearing_detail.cfm?id=321325&. 
 192 See supra notes 161-162 and corresponding texts.  Senator Grassley is the only sponsor 
of this bill who is affiliated with the Republican Party; the other four sponsors, along with 
Senator Kohl, are members of the Democratic Party. CA Advocates for Nursing Home 
Reform, supra note 161. 
 193   See supra notes 181-183 and accompanying texts. 
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statistically significant relationship (b = -.012 and significant at the 90% level), 
although not the positive one we postulated.  In other words, controlling for all the 
other variables, an increase in the percentage of for-profit chain nursing homes in 
states, results in a decrease in the citation of deficiencies.  This is a most puzzling 
finding that runs intriguingly contrary to the grain and weight of the literature.  We 
surmise this result to be due to under-reporting of deficiencies or, less plausibly, 
chance–although we must disclose that a recent study, using measures different  
from  ours,  reached a similar finding.195  
 
Thesis 
   
Statement 
  
Finding 
 
1 
 
Relationship between party 
affiliation and citation of 
deficiencies (Democratic 
governor) 
 
Not supported and observed 
difference is not statistically 
significant.  
 
2 
 
Relationship between party 
affiliation and citation of 
deficiencies (Democratic-
controlled legislatures) 
 
Supported and statistically 
significant. 
 
3 
 
Relationship between party 
affiliation and citation of 
deficiencies (split-control 
legislatures) 
 
Not supported and observed 
difference is not statistically 
significant.  
 
4 
 
Relationship comparing 
variations in CMMS regional 
offices 1-8 and 10 with region  
 office 9 (encompassing 
California) 
 
Supported and observed differences 
are statistically significant, except 
for Region 10. 
 
5 
 
Hospital-affiliated nursing 
homes and citation of 
deficiencies. 
 
Supported but not statistically 
significant.  
 
6 
 
Chain nursing homes and 
citation of deficiencies 
 
Intriguingly not supported but 
statistically significant. 
 
                                                          
 195 See Mitchell et al., supra note 140, at 9 (stating that “chain membership may lead to an 
overall reduction in quality of services.”); see also id. at 18 (concluding that, controlling “for a 
wide range of facility, resident, and market characteristics,” “non-profits have higher quality 
and costs than for-profit facilities.”). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION  
This study analyzed the impacts of political factors,  oversight, and affiliation or 
ownership status of nursing homes on the enforcement of the nursing home 
regulatory regime as it has evolved from the Social Security amendments creating 
Medicare and Medicaid through the NHRA to the social security legislation enacted 
as part of the healthcare overhaul of the current Obama administration.  Our specific 
aim was to understand the factors that influence variations in the citation of 
deficiencies for violation of standards by state inspectors charged with responsibility 
for implementing the nursing home regulatory scheme.   
Prior studies have speculated on the possible influence of political factors on 
inspectors’ citation of deficiencies for violation of  standards.196 This article is the 
first of its kind, by political scientists, drawing on public administration concepts, to 
systematically measure and test some of those political factors, with specific 
reference to their influence on the citation of deficiencies by state inspectors 
enforcing the nursing home regulatory regime and inspection system. We are avid 
students of public administration who, in conducting this study, first had to 
harmonize our emphasis on "political factors" with an American public 
administration, which, duly awake to the extensive involvement of unelected 
bureaucrats in policymaking, long ago yanked off as fiction, the doctrine that 
claimed to separate politics from administration.  Immersion of public administrators 
into politics, in negation of the politics-administration doctrine, should not preclude 
us from measuring factors that would seem political, so long as we are able to isolate 
and diligently pinpoint which factors we are measuring.  To be on the safe side, we 
confined our measurement of political factors  around the two major political parties 
in the U.S. system.  Even so we do not dispute the fact that all the factors involved in 
this study, including oversight, and nursing home ownership are arguably embedded 
in politics. 
Generally, our findings matched our conceptual framework and the literature. 
They also, as well, provided strong evidence that political factors, in the manner we 
measured those variables in this Article, influence the citation of deficiencies by 
inspectors monitoring nursing  homes.  However, there was insufficient evidence to 
support our hypothesis that states with governors affiliated with the Democratic 
Party would experience more citation of deficiencies, compared to governors 
affiliated  with the Republican Party, although for the state legislature variable, states 
with legislatures dominated or controlled by the Democratic Party registered a higher 
number of deficiency citations, compared to states controlled by the Republican 
Party and this finding was statistically significant.  Oversight similarly influenced 
inspectors' citation of deficiencies. Except for Region 10, practically all of the 
regional office variables were statistically significant. Moreover, compared to 
Region 9 (our comparison category), all of the other regions registered fewer 
citations of deficiencies.  This finding might reflect under-reporting of deficiencies, 
variation in the oversight methods the regional offices employed, or better quality of 
care in most of the regions, compared to Region 9.  Contrary to the literature and our 
expectation, for-profit chain facilities intriguingly received fewer citations of 
                                                          
 196 See GAO 10-70, ADDRESSING THE FACTORS UNDERLYING THE UNDERSTATEMENT OF 
SERIOUS CARE PROBLEMS REQUIRES SUSTAINED CMS AND STATE COMMITMENT, supra note 
11; Charlene Harrington & H. Carrillo, The Regulation and Enforcement of Federal Nursing 
Home Standards, 1991-1997, 56 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 471 (1999). 
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deficiencies.   A previous study, using concepts and measurements different from 
our own, also reached the same result. But given GAO studies that rank these chain 
homes to be the most poorly performing, this finding, more likely than not, also 
reflects under-reporting among inspectors. 
Despite the light that it sheds on the operations of the nursing home regulatory 
regime, this study, like any other, has its limitations or caveats.  Our focus here 
relates to the oversight system, specifically measurement of the oversight variable of 
CMMS's ten regional offices. Constraints in data availability prevented us from 
capturing components of the oversight system likely to impact citation of 
deficiencies, such as inspectors' qualifications, hours worked, experience, number of 
comparative inspections and of observational inspections conducted per year, type 
and quantity of training provided to state inspectors, budget size, and number of 
remedies and sanctions imposed on state inspection agencies.  Thus, while these and 
other factors, such as differences in staff size, number of hours spent conducting 
inspections, and budgetary allocations might provide a more accurate understanding 
of variations across CMMS regional offices, the lack of available data limited this 
study to the use of dummy variables. To minimize problems, such as under-
reporting, plaguing the inspection system and promote better monitoring of state 
inspection agencies, CMMS regional offices must begin requiring state inspectors to 
select homes that have no established patterns of deficiencies. To improve the 
quality of care to nursing home residents across the nation, they must also begin to 
comply with regulations mandating them to conduct comparison inspections of 5% 
of the homes in each region.   
Future studies on this topic should focus on the factors we used in this Article as 
well as broader constructs of variations across CMMS regional offices’ oversight.  
They should also examine interaction among variables that can influence inspectors’ 
citation of deficiencies.  The need for broader constructs and interaction variables is 
dictated by the large  variation in deficiency citations unexplained by this study. At a 
record 48%, the figure suggests the operation of some other factors, not included in 
our own model, that influence inspectors’ citation of deficiencies.  Still, our study 
increased understanding on the impact of political and not-so-political factors, such 
as oversight and nursing home ownership status, on citation of deficiencies for 
violations of regulations governing nursing homes. Future studies should also 
examine how to improve consistency across the CMMS’s regional offices oversight 
in order to ameliorate state inspection processes and, ultimately, quality of care in 
nursing homes that takes into account the influence of state-level political factors.  
By this study, we have provided some foundation that those future studies could 
build on, keeping a close eye on the limitations that we have identified.   Finally, 
ours is a macro-level study of the inspection system that could be complemented 
with micro-level studies of states other than California. These micro-level studies, 
percolating already in states like Minnesota and New York,197 should be extended to 
other U.S. states and territories. 
 
                                                          
 197 See, e.g., Cynthia Rudder & Charles D. Phillips, Citations and Sanctions in the Nursing 
Home Enforcement System in New York State: Their Use and Effects, 21  GENERATIONS 21 
(1997); Iris C. Freeman, Nursing Home Politics at the State Level and Implications for 
Quality: The Minnesota Example 44  GENERATIONS 48 (1997).  
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Table 2.  Scope and Severity of Deficiencies 
 Scope Sanction a 
Severity Category 
Isolated 
 
Pattern Widespread Required Optional 
Actual or potential 
for death/serious 
injury b J K L Group 3 Group 1 or 2 
Other actual harm G H I Group 2 Group 1c 
Potential for more 
than minimal harm 
D E F 
Group 1 for 
categories D 
and E; group 
2 for 
category F 
Group 2 for 
categories D 
and E; group 
1 for category 
F 
Potential for 
minimal harm 
(substantial 
compliance) A B C None None 
Source: GAO/HEHS 99-46, NURSING HOMES: ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED TO 
STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL QUALITY STANDARDS, supra note 27.   
 aGroup 1: sanctions are directed plan of correction, directed in-service 
training, and/or state monitoring. 
 Group 2: sanctions are denial of payment for new admissions or all 
individuals and/or civil monetary penalties of $50 to $3,000 per day of 
noncompliance. 
 Group 3: sanctions are temporary management, termination, and/or civil 
monetary penalties of $3,050 to $10,000 per day of noncompliance. 
b This category is referred to in regulations as “immediate jeopardy.” 
c Sanctions for category 1 also include option for temporary management. 
 
Note:  The letters in the “isolated,” “pattern,” and “widespread” categories show 
the severity of the deficiencies, where “A” is a problem with the potential for 
minimal harm and is an isolated incident.  The letter “L” indicates that there is a 
facility problem that is widespread and many residents have actually been harmed or 
have the potential for being harmed. 
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Table 3.  Enforcement Sanctions 
 
Sanctions Description 
In 
Place 
Before 
NHRA
Added or  
Expanded 
Under 
NHRA 
Civil Monetary 
Penalties 
Penalties ranging from $50 to 
$10,000. 
 X 
Temporary 
Management 
The nursing home accepts a 
substitute manager appointed by 
the state with the authority to 
hire, terminate, and reassign 
staff; obligate funds; and alter 
facility procedures as 
appropriate. 
 X 
Denial of 
Payments 
Medicare and/or Medicaid 
payments can be denied for all 
covered residents or for newly 
admitted residents. 
X X 
Directed in-
service Training 
The nursing home is required to 
provide training to staff on a 
specific issue identified as a 
problem in the inspection. 
 X 
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Table 3.   Enforcement Sanctions (Continued).  
 
Sanctions Description 
In 
Place 
Before 
NHRA
Added or  
Expanded 
Under 
NHRA 
Directed Plan 
of Correction 
The facility would be required to 
take action within specified time 
frames according to a plan of 
correction developed by the 
HCFA,198 the state, or the 
temporary manager. 
 X 
State 
Monitoring 
An on-site state monitor can be 
placed in the nursing home to 
help ensure that the home 
achieves and maintains 
compliance. 
 
X 
 
 
Termination The provider is no longer eligible 
to receive Medicare and 
Medicaid payments for 
beneficiaries residing in the 
facility. 
X             X 
Source: GAO/HEHS 99-46, NURSING HOMES: ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED TO 
STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL QUALITY STANDARDS, supra note 27.   
                                                          
 198 The acronym stands for the former name of the agency that is today christened the 
CMMS.  See supra note 100. 
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Table 4.  Information on CMMS Regional Offices   
Regional 
Offices 
States in 
Each Region 
Number of 
Nursing 
Homes in 
the Region 
Number of 
Regional 
Inspectors 
Number of 
Required 
Comparative 
Inspections 
Region I, 
Boston, MA 
ME, VT, NH, 
MA, CT, RI 1,170 12 59 
Region II, 
New York, 
NY 
NY, NJ, 
Puerto Rico, 
Virgin Island 1,020 7 51 
Region III, 
Philadelphia, 
PA 
PA, MD, DE, 
WV, VA 1,526 12 76 
Region IV, 
Atlanta, GA 
GA, FL, KY, 
TN, NC, SC, 
GA, AL, MS 2,772 18 139 
Region V, 
Chicago, IL 
MN, WI, IL, 
MI, IN, OH 3,784 22 189 
Region VI, 
Dallas, TX 
NM, TX, OK, 
AR, LA 2,398 11 120 
Region VII, 
Kansas City, 
MO 
MO, IA, KS, 
NE 1,693 12 85 
Region VIII, 
Denver, CO 
UT, WY, 
MT, ND, SD 666 8 33 
Region IX, 
San 
Francisco, 
CA 
CA, NV, AZ, 
HI, Guam, 
Samoa 
 
1,681 11 84 
Region X, 
Seattle, WA 
AK, ID, OR, 
WA 497 9 25 
Source: GAO/HEHS 00-6, NURSING HOMES: ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED TO 
STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL QUALITY STANDARDS, supra note 27. 
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Table 5.  Description of Variables Used in This Study 
Variable  Definition   Mean (SD) Range    N 
Deficiencies   The average number of  
deficiencies cited per facility 
  by state     6.08 (2.65) 1.5 - 15.6 490 
 
Hospital  
Affiliation Percent of certified hospital- 
  based facilities  15.06 (11.47)  0 - 69.2 490 
 
Chain  
Affiliation Percent of facilities that  
  were owned or leased by  
  multi-facility  
  organizations  52.71 (12.99) 8.1 - 79.8 490 
 
Governor Categorical measure for the  
  party affiliation of the governor 
  of the state199    0 - 1   477 
 
Republican  Dummy variable for states with both  
  houses of legislature controlled by  
  the Republican Party    0 - 1  473 
 
Democrat  Dummy variable for states with both 
  houses of legislature controlled by 
the Democratic Party    0 - 1   473 
 
Split  Dummy variable for states with each  
  house of legislature controlled by one  
  of the two dominant Parties  
(Republican and Democratic Parties)  0 - 1   473 
 
Region 1      0 - 1  490 
Region 2      0 - 1  490 
Region 3      0 - 1  490 
Region 4      0 - 1  490 
Region 5      0 - 1  490  
Region 6      0 - 1  490 
Region 7      0 - 1  490 
Region 8      0 - 1  490 
Region 9      0 - 1  490 
Region 10      0 - 1  490 
                                                          
 199 The party affiliation of the governor of the state was coded 0 = Republican Party and 1 
= Democratic Party.  Governors identified as independents were excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 5.   Description of Variables Used in This Study (Continued) 
Variable  Definition Mean (SD) Range    N 
1995 0 – 1 490 
1996        0 – 1 490 
1997       0 – 1  490 
1998       0 – 1  490 
1999       0 – 1  490 
2000       0 – 1  490 
2001 0 – 1 490 
2002 0 – 1 490 
2003 0 – 1 490 
2004 0 – 1 490 
Lag of Deficiencies  5.84 (2.56)  1.5 – 18.4 490 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
